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Essays in Quantitative Economics and International Finance
Abstract
This dissertation uses quantitative dynamic models to study two separate questions in international finance
and international labor markets.
In Chapter 2, we build a two-country two-good incomplete markets general equilibrium model of
international portfolio choice, and use it to study global imbalances, in particular the large negative net foreign
asset position, and international portfolio composition of the United States. We show that the ``exorbitant
privilege'' of the US (ability to borrow in domestic currency) and lower volatility of macroeconomic shocks
that the US has experienced since mid-80s can account for a large part of the negative net foreign position of
the US, and also generate a realistic portfolio structure.
In Chapter 3, we study the differences in labor supply between the US and Europe. Using micro data from the
US and eight European countries, we document that the difference between the US and Europe is mainly
driven by the labor supply of women.European women work less than American women, whether it is single
women, married women, or women with and without children. Using a larger number of countries, we also
document that there is a strong correlation between divorce rates and female employment rates across
countries and across time. A recent literature, including Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2005), argues that
differences in labor supply between the US and Europe can largely be explained by differences in tax rates. We
use tax data from the OECD to develop tax schedules for a sample of 17 countries. The empirical correlation
between hours worked and different measures of tax levels and progressivity is negative, however weak.
Motivated by these observations, we develop a life-cycle model with heterogeneous agents, marriage and
divorce and use it to study the impact of two mechanisms: 1) differences in marriage stability and 2)
differences in tax systems on labor supply. There are three types of households; single males, single females
and married households. Divorces and marriages occur stochastically. The main channel through which
individual divorce and singlehood rates impact labor supply is by reducing the implicit insurance of marriage,
and thereby providing incentives for individuals to invest in experience. We calibrate our model to US data
and study how labor supply in the US changes as we introduce European tax systems, and as we replace the
US divorce and marriage rates with their European equivalents. We find that the divorce and tax mechanisms
combined on average explain 28% of the difference between the US and 11 European countries.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN QUANTITATIVE MACROECONOMICS
AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
Serhiy Stepanchuk
Supervisor: Dirk Krueger, Professor of Economics
This dissertation uses quantitative dynamic models to study two separate questions
in international finance and international labor markets.
In Chapter 2, we build a two-country two-good incomplete markets general equi-
librium model of international portfolio choice, and use it to study global imbalances,
in particular the large negative net foreign asset position, and international portfolio
composition of the United States. We show that the “exorbitant privilege” of the US
(ability to borrow in domestic currency) and lower volatility of macroeconomic shocks
that the US has experienced since mid-80s can account for a large part of the negative
net foreign position of the US, and also generate a realistic portfolio structure.
In Chapter 3, we study the differences in labor supply between the US and Europe.
Using micro data from the US and eight European countries, we document that
the difference between the US and Europe is mainly driven by the labor supply
of women. European women work less than American women, whether it is single
women, married women, or women with and without children. Using a larger number
of countries, we also document that there is a strong correlation between divorce rates
and female employment rates across countries and across time. A recent literature,
including Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2005), argues that differences in labor supply
between the US and Europe can largely be explained by differences in tax rates. We
use tax data from the OECD to develop tax schedules for a sample of 17 countries.
The empirical correlation between hours worked and different measures of tax levels
iii
and progressivity is negative, however, weak. Motivated by these observations, we
develop a life-cycle model with heterogeneous agents, marriage and divorce and use
it to study the impact of two mechanisms: 1) differences in marriage stability and
2) differences in tax systems on labor supply. There are three types of households;
single males, single females and married households. Divorces and marriages occur
stochastically. The main channel through which individual divorce and singlehood
rates impact labor supply is by reducing the implicit insurance of marriage, and
thereby providing incentives for individuals to invest in experience. We calibrate our
model to US data and study how labor supply in the US changes as we introduce
European tax systems, and as we replace the US divorce and marriage rates with
their European equivalents. We find that the divorce and tax mechanisms combined
on average explain 28% of the difference between the US and 11 European countries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation uses quantitative dynamic models to study two separate questions
in international finance and international labor markets.
In Chapter 2 (which is co-authored with Viktor Tsyrennikov), we build a two-
country two-good incomplete markets general equilibrium model of international port-
folio choice, and use it to study global imbalances, in particular the large negative net
foreign asset position, and international portfolio composition of the United States.
We assume that there are three assets that are traded internationally: claims to do-
mestic and foreign equity, and a bond. We depart from a symmetric two-country
setting, and evaluate the impact of the following two features of the economic envi-
ronment on the international asset portfolio of the U.S.: a) the ability of the U.S. to
issue bonds in domestic currency (“exorbitant privilege”), and b) lower volatility of
output in the U.S. compared to the rest of the world. We model the “exorbitant priv-
ilege” by assuming that the bond’s payoffs are denominated in domestic goods. We
calibrate the model so that it is consistent with the data with respect to the behavior
of the relative goods’ prices, home equity bias and consumption-real exchange rate
disconnect. We find that in equilibrium, the U.S. accumulates a negative position in
1
the bond, and has a large negative overall net foreign asset position.
In Chapter 3 (co-authored with Hans Holter and Indraneel Chakraborty), we study
the differences in labor supply between the US and Europe. Aggregate labor supply
is higher in America than in Europe, and there is also substantial variation within
Europe. Using micro data from the US and eight European countries, we document
that the difference between the US and Europe is mainly driven by the labor supply
of women. European women work less than American women, whether it is single
women, married women, or women with and without children. Using a larger number
of countries, we also document that there is a strong correlation between divorce rates
and female employment rates across countries and across time. A recent literature,
including Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2005), argues that differences in labor supply
between the US and Europe can largely be explained by differences in tax rates. We
use tax data from the OECD to develop tax schedules for a sample of 17 countries.
The empirical correlation between hours worked and different measures of tax levels
and progressivity is negative, however, weak. Motivated by these observations, we
develop a life-cycle model with heterogeneous agents, marriage and divorce and use
it to study the impact of two mechanisms: 1) differences in marriage stability and
2) differences in tax systems on labor supply. There are three types of households;
single males, single females and married households. Divorces and marriages occur
stochastically. The main channel through which individual divorce and singlehood
rates impact labor supply is by reducing the implicit insurance of marriage, and
thereby providing incentives for individuals to invest in experience. We calibrate our
model to US data and study how labor supply in the US changes as we introduce
European tax systems, and as we replace the US divorce and marriage rates with
their European equivalents. We find that the divorce and tax mechanisms combined
on average explain 28% of the difference between the US and 11 European countries.
2
This finding is sensitive to the use of tax revenues.
3
Chapter 2
International Portfolios: An
Incomplete Markets General
Equilibrium Approach
2.1 Introduction
A recent wave of financial integration that started in mid-80’s has led to a surge in
international asset trade, and a build-up of large cross-border gross asset positions1.
At the same time, there has been an emergence of the so-called “global imbalances”.
One of the most well-known aspects of the “global imbalances” that has recently
came to the forefront of policy discussion has been a large and persistent negative
net international asset position of the largest world economy, the United States. This
has revived the interest in the analysis of the countries’ international portfolios. For
example, Obstfeld (2004) argues that understanding the structure of the countries’
portfolios is of first-order importance for the analysis of external adjustment, claiming
1See Gourinchas & Rey (2005), Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2005) and Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
for a detailed account of these developments.
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that “appropriate concepts of external balance adjustment cannot be defined without
reference to the structure of national portfolios”.
Figure 2.1, constructed using the data from the Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
dataset, shows the sharp increase in the U.S. gross positions in two major asset
categories – debt and equity, since mid-80’s. It also shows the country’s net position
in these two asset categories 2.
Figure 2.1: US external positions in debt and portfolio equity
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Figure 2.1 shows that the overall U.S. net foreign asset position has been driven by
a growth in debt obligations, while the net position in equity has actually improved.
Gourinchas & Rey (2005) conclude that “as financial globalization accelerated its
2The dataset is available on-line at http://www.philiplane.org/EWN.html. It contains the
data on the net foreign asset positions (total and in several asset categories) for 178 countries for
the 1970-2007 period.
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pace, the U.S. transformed itself from a world banker into a world venture capitalist,
investing greater amounts into high yield assets such as equity and FDI”, while “its
liabilities have remained dominated by bank loans, trade credit and debt, i.e. low
yield safe assets”. A similar observation is made by Obstfeld (2004), who states that
for the United States, “the striking change since the early 1980s is the sharp growth
in foreign portfolio equity holdings”, while on the liabilities’ side, “the most dramatic
percentage increase has been in the share of U.S. bonds held by foreigners”3.
To explain the structure of the U.S. international portfolio, and the U.S. negative
net foreign asset position, we develop a two-country general equilibrium model with
many assets, incomplete financial markets and portfolio choice. We use the model to
evaluate the effect of the following two features of the economic environment on the
portfolio structure of the domestic economy:
1. Exorbitant privilege. Figure 2.2, constructed using the data from the Lane &
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Lane & Shambaugh (2009) datasets, shows that the U.S.,
the issuer of the main global currency, has also been able to issue most of its debt
liabilities in its own currency. Until the introduction of the Euro, only about 20% of
the internationally-traded debt issued by all other countries has been denominated in
the local currency of the issuring country. Even after the introduction of the Euro,
this share remains under 50%. For comparison, the figure also shows the share of
debt liabilities issued in local currency (Japanese yen) by Japan. Interestingly, over
the 1990-2004 period (the period over which the data are available), on average the
share of debt liabilities issued by Japan in the U.S. dollars (41.2%) exceeded the share
of debt issued in yen (37.6%).
Eichengreen, Hausmann & Panizza (2002) analyze the determinants of the coun-
3See also Higgins, Tille & Klitgaard (2007), Tille (2005), Mendoza, Quadrini & Rios-Rull (2008)
and Obstfeld & Rogoff (2005).
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Figure 2.2: Share of debt liabilities issued in own currency: the U.S., Japan and the
Rest of the World
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try’s ability to issue international debt in its own currency. They find that country
size is the only robust determinant of the country’s ability to issue debt in own cur-
rency. They also find that the effects of various measures of economic and financial
development, the soundness of the country’s monetary and fiscal policy, the degree of
openness are statistically and economically insignificant. They conclude that the in-
ternationally traded debt “is concentrated in a very few currencies for reasons largely
beyond the control of the excluded countries”, and call this finding “the original sin”4.
In our model, we will assume that the structure of the international debt market
is exogenously fixed. We will model the exorbitant privilege by assuming that there
is only one internationally-traded bond, whose payoff is denominated in terms of the
4Hasan (2010) develops a model where he shows that the debt issued in the currency of a larger
country will have lower equilibrium interest rate. If this effect is large enough, one can imagine
that no one would be willing to borrow in high-interest debt instruments issued in the currencies of
smaller countries
7
domestic consumption good.
2. Relative volatility of output shocks. Fogli & Perri (2006) document that after
1985, the U.S. has experienced a larger fall in business cycle volatility compared to
other countries, and propose this as an explanation for the deterioration in the U.S.
net foreign asset position. Since their model has only one internationally-traded asset
– a risk-less bond, they don’t obtain any implications for the portfolio structure. We
find that during the 1985-2007 period, the volatility of output in the U.S. has been
about 1.5 times less volatile than in the rest of the OECD countries. We use our
model to evaluate the impact of this difference in relative output volatilities on the
international portfolio structure and the NFA position of the domestic economy.
We find that in our model, both the exorbitant privilege and the difference in
output volatilities contribute to generating a large negative net foreign asset position
for the home country, and also produce the portfolio structure that resembles the
one observed in the U.S., with a short position in debt and a large share of wealth
invested in risky assets like equity. We will show that the exorbitant privilege changes
the correlation between the bond’s payoff and home country non-traded income, and
makes the bond whose payoff is denominated in home country goods an undesirable
hedging instrument for domestic investors. Lower volatility of output in home country
works through the precautionary savings channel, making domestic investors endoge-
nously less risk-averse than their foreign counterparts. This causes foreign investors
to accumulate precautionary savings in a relatively less risky bond.
Methodologically, we build on the numerical method developed in Kubler &
Schmedders (2003). This allows us to obtain a numerical solution to our model that is
globally accurate, while the perturbation methods for solving the international port-
folio choice model recently developed in Tille & Van Wincoop (2010) and Devereux &
Sutherland (2006) are designed to offer an accurate solution only locally around some
8
fixed wealth distribution. The large magnitude of the negative NFA position that the
U.S. has accumulated since 1985 imply large changes in the global financial wealth
distribution, making the numerical method that we use a better suited tool for the
analysis of international portfolio choice in the environment with global imbalances.
The structure of our paper is as follows. In section 2.2, we set up the model and
reformulate it recursively, so that it can be analyzed using our numerical algorithm.
In section 2.3, we consider a simplified version of our model to get some economic
intuition for the mechanisms that drive our results. In section 2.4, we describe the
algorithm, and test its performance in a special case of our model, where we can
describe solution analytically. In section 2.6, we obtain and discuss the results from
our calibrated model. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Economic Environment
We assume that there are only two countries, “Home” (representing the U.S.) and
“Foreign” (representing the rest of the world, or RoW). Both economies are pop-
ulated by a representative consumer/investor. Time is discrete and is indexed by
t = 0, . . . ,∞. Each period, both countries are endowed with some quantity of a local
perishable good. The consumers in both countries enjoy both consumption goods,
but have a relative preference towards the consumption of their local good (“home
bias in consumption”). To differentiate between the domestic and foreign consumers,
we will denote all foreign consumers’ choice variables by an asterisk.
Each period t, one of finitely many possible states of the world, zt ∈ Z =
{z1, . . . , zn}, realizes. The state of the world characterizes all relevant risks in our
model. In particular, the endowment of both consumption goods in each period is a
9
time-invariant function of the state of the world, eh : Z → R++ and ef : Z → R++.
We will assume that only some part of the output in each country is “capitalized” –
that is, it comes in the form of the dividends from the two Lucas trees that represent
the stock indices in the two countries. The rest of the output is non-traded. We
will refer to it as “wages”, but as will be clear from our calibration, we intend it to
also include the profits of the companies that are not publicly traded through the
stock markets. The division of output between the dividends and the wages is also
determined by the realization of the state of the world: eh(zt) = dh(zt) + wh(zt) and
ef (zt) = df(zt) + wf(zt)
5.
We assume that the exogenous shock that determines the state of the world follows
a first-order Markov process, with the probability transition matrix Π. A partial
history of state realizations (z0, . . . , zt) is denoted by z
t. Given the partial history
zt, the conditional probability of state zt+1 next period depends only on the current
realization of state zt, and is denoted by π(zt+1|zt).
Preferences. Consumers in both countries trade in financial and goods markets to
achieve maximum expected lifetime utility. For domestic consumers, it is given by:
Uh(c) = E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(gh(cht, cft))
∣∣∣z0], β ∈ (0, 1). (2.1)
Function gh is the CES consumption aggregator, which takes the form:
gh(ch, cf) = (shc
ρ
h + (1− sh)c
ρ
f)
1/ρ, ρ < 1, sh > 0.5.
Parameter ρ controls the elasticity of substitution between the two consumption
5In particular, we will not assume, as is often done in the literature, that dividends are a constant
fraction of the output. This will allow us to account for the fact that dividends are significantly
more volatile than output.
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goods. The assumption that sh > 0.5 introduces the home bias in consumption.
We will assume that the instantaneous utility function u takes a standard CRRA
utility function form:
u(g) =
g1−γ
1− γ
, γ > 0.
Foreign consumers maximize a similar lifetime expected utility function, with c∗ht,
c∗ft and sf replacing cht, cft and sh.
Financial Markets. In a model with endowment economies and consumers with
standard expected utility preferences, assuming complete financial markets has a num-
ber of unrealistic implications. First, Judd, Kubler & Schmedders (2000) demonstrate
that this typically implies that consumers choose constant financial portfolios that do
not change over time, with no trade in assets in any period beyond the initial period.
This means that the only source of the changes in a country’s net foreign asset po-
sition would be the valuation effects (changes in assets’ prices), while the traditional
measure of the current account which excludes the asset valuation changes is always
zero. Second, Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1992) show that it also has counterfactual
implications for the cross-country correlation of consumption, while Backus & Smith
(1993) show that it has counterfactual implications for the cross-country correlation
between relative consumption and real exchange rate. We assume in our model that
financial markets are incomplete, so that the number of internationally-traded assets
with linearly independent payoffs is smaller than the number of the exogenous shock
realizations. In particular, we assume that only the following 3 assets are traded
internationally – two Lucas trees representing the stock indices in the two countries,
and a single one-period internationally traded bond. The stocks represent claims to
the future stream of dividends paid in the two countries’ consumption goods, and
are traded at the ex-dividend prices qh and qf . We assume that the bond’s payoff is
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denominated in the consumption good of the home country. The price of the bond is
given by qb. With ph and pf denoting the prices of the two consumption goods, the
payoffs to the two stocks and the bond are:
rh ≡ qh + phdh,
rf ≡ qf + pfdf ,
rb ≡ ph.
Taste shocks. We will show in section 2.3 that the position that domestic investors
take in the bond in our model depends crucially on the behavior of the relative
goods’ prices 6. To account for the behavior of the relative goods’ prices in the data,
we follow Stockman & Tesar (1995) and introduce taste shocks to our model, as a
simple reduced-form way to model the demand-side shocks7. We model these taste
shocks by allowing the preference weights, sh and sf , to vary with zt. We assume
that the taste shocks are i.i.d. and independent of the output shocks.
Government Debt. We abstract from the government sector and physical invest-
ments in our model. In public opinion, foreign debt in the United States is often
related to the government debt. Figure 2.2.1 shows the evolution of the government
debt and NFA position in the US (as a share of GDP) from 1970 to 20078. It demon-
strates that while the two closely tracked one another roughly till 1990, there appears
to be little connection between the two since then. Figure 2.7 in appendix shows
6The behavior of relative prices also heavily influences the U.S. NFA position in the data. Ac-
cording to the data from the BEA, the average size of the annual changes in the U.S. NFA position
that can be contributed to the exchange rate fluctuations over 1989-2009 period was 32% of the
changes caused by the financial flows.
7Pavlova & Rigobon (2007) and Heathcote & Perri (2009) make a similar assumption.
8Government debt is shown with a negative sign, which corresponds to the negative bond position
in our model.
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the annual changes in the government debt/GDP and NFA/GDP positions over the
same time. It confirms that the two variables followed each other till about 1970
(the correlation between them over the 1970-1989 period is 0.654), but have moved
much further apart since then (the correlation between the two variables over the
whole 1970-2007 period is only 0.013). Figures 2.8 and 2.9 in appendix show that
qualitatively a similar picture arises when one considers the US NFA position in debt
instruments (“bonds”).
Figure 2.3: US Government Debt and NFA position
Scale for government debt/GDP is on the right, for NFA/GDP on the left
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Budget constraints. Let (θh, θf , b) denote the domestic consumer’s portfolio that
consists of his position in the domestic and the foreign stock, and the bond. For
each history of shocks zt, domestic consumer faces a budget constraint that takes the
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following form:
ph(z
t)ch(z
t) + pf(z
t)cf(z
t) + qh(z
t)θh(z
t) + qf (z
t)θf (z
t) + qb(z
t)b(zt) = Ih(z
t), (2.2)
where Ih is domestic consumer’s “cash-in-hand” – the market value of their non-traded
income and their financial portfolio (including the dividends):
Ih(z
t) ≡ ph(z
t)wh(z
t) + rb(z
t)b(zt−1) + rh(z
t)θh(z
t−1) + rf(z
t)θf (z
t−1).
Foreign consumers face similar budget constraints, with (θ∗h, θ
∗
f , b
∗), (c∗h, c
∗
f) and If
replacing (θh, θf , b), (ch, cf) and Ih.
In addition to the budget constraints, we assume that investors face short-selling
constraints on stocks, θh > 0, θf > 0, θ
∗
h > 0 and θ
∗
f > 0
9, and a borrowing limit on
the bond that we describe next.
Borrowing limit. We assume that the amount that the investors in both countries
can borrow using the internationally-traded bond is proportional to the lowest possible
realization of the value of their wages next period. In particular, we require that:
min
zt+1
(
kwh(z
t+1)ph(z
t+1) + b(zt)rb(z
t+1)
)
≥ 0, ∀zt (2.3)
for some k > 0, and similarly for the foreign active traders. The parameter k controls
the tightness of the borrowing limit.
Intuitively, if k = 1, this borrowing limit requires the consumer to be able to repay
his debt for all possible realizations of the exogenous shock next period, using his non-
traded income only 10. We get additional flexibility by allowing k to be different from
9The short-selling constraints can be easily generalized to θh > −t¯, θf > −t¯, θ
∗
h > −t¯ and θ
∗
f > −t¯
for some t¯ ∈ R+.
10In this case, our formulation of the borrowing limit is similar to Kiyotaki & Moore (1997), who
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1. In our baseline model in section 2.6.1, our strategy is to set k generous enough so
that our results are not driven by potentially binding borrowing constraints (we set
k = 3). One can also allow k to differ between the countries11, however we do not
use it in this paper.
Competitive equilibrium. For any initial realization of the exogenous state z0
and the initial distribution of asset holdings (θh(z0), θf(z0), b(z0)), we can define a
competitive equilibrium in a standard manner, as:
- a prices system P = {ph(z
t), pf(z
t), qh(z
t), qf(z
t), qb(z
t), ∀zt},
- a consumption allocation C = {ch(z
t), cf(z
t), c∗h(z
t), c∗(zt), ∀zt},
- portfolio positions A = {θh(z
t), θf(z
t), θ∗h(z
t), θ∗f(z
t), ∀zt},
such that:
a) Given the prices, the consumption allocation and portfolio choices solve the opti-
mization problem for every consumer.
b) For all zt, markets clear:
c∗h(z
t) + ch(z
t) = eh(z
t),
c∗f (z
t) + cf (z
t) = ef (z
t),
θh(z
t) + θ∗h(z
t) = 1,
θf (z
t) + θ∗f (z
t) = 1,
b(zt) + b∗(zt) = 0.
require that the amount the borrower has to repay should not exceed the market value of his land
holdings next period.
11This could potentially be useful to model the finding in Reinhart, Rogoff & Savastano (2003),
who argue that many emerging economies can sustain substantially lower levels of debt compared
to more advanced economies.
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We add the following price normalization: ph(z
t) + pf (z
t) = 1 for all zt.
2.2.2 Wealth-recursive equilibria
Since we are interested in finding the equilibrium in our model economy numerically,
we will concentrate on equilibria that can be represented in a recursive form, as a map
from some state space into all current endogenous variables (the policy functions),
and a transition function that describes the evolution of the state variable(s) over
time12.
The choice of the state space has both theoretical and practical consequences. On
the one hand, the current state must be a sufficient statistic for the future evolu-
tion of the system. On the other hand, a high-dimensional state-space can lead to
insurmountable computational difficulties – the so-called “curse of dimensionality”.
The description of the budget sets of the investors in the previous section suggests
that the distribution of “cash-in-hand”, or wealth between the investors is a natu-
ral candidate for being the only endogenous state variable (in addition to exogenous
shock) in our model. Following Kubler & Schmedders (2002), we will call this type
of equilibrium a “wealth-recursive” equilibrium. Using wealth shares (as opposed
to the beginning-of-period portfolios) as the single state variable offers the practical
advantage of reducing the dimensionality of the numerical problem that we need to
solve.
Wealth share as a state variable. For our numerical algorithm, it will be important
to have a compact state space. We assume that the exogenous shocks come from some
finite set. We define our endogenous continuous state variable, the wealth share, so
12Duffie, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell & McLennan (1994) call this type of equilibria “dynamically
simple”. They argue that it is reasonable to concentrate on these equilibria, since equilibria that do
not display some minimal regularity through time will require implausibly high degree of coordination
between the agents. Krueger & Kubler (2008) provide an overview of this type of equilibria and
their applications in macroeconomics.
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that given our portfolio constraints, it will lie in the unit interval. To achieve this
result, we first need to redefine the investors’ “cash-in-hand” as:
I˜h(z
t) = kwh(zt)ph(z
t) + rb(z
t)b(zt−1) + rh(z
t)θh(z
t−1) + rf(z
t)θf (z
t−1),
I˜f (z
t) = kwf (zt)pf (z
t) + rb(z
t)b∗(zt−1) + rh(z
t)θ∗h(z
t−1) + rf(z
t)θ∗f (z
t−1).
The total wealth of the investors worldwide is:
I˜(zt) = I˜h(z
t) + I˜f(z
t) = k(wh(zt)ph(z
t) + wf(zt)pf (z
t)) + rh(z
t) + rf(z
t),
which follows from the asset market clearing conditions, b+ b∗ = 0, θh + θ
∗
h = 1 and
θf + θ
∗
f = 1. Note that with strictly positive prices, the total wealth is always strictly
positive.
As the next step, let us define the wealth shares of domestic and foreign investors
as:
ωh(z
t) =
I˜h(z
t)
I˜(zt)
, ωf(z
t) =
I˜f(z
t)
I˜(zt)
. (2.5)
Note that ωh(z
t) +ωf (z
t) = 1 for all zt by construction. The following lemma is very
useful for our computational algorithm.
Lemma 2.2.1. Given the short-sale constraints on equity positions and the borrowing
limit defined by 2.3, the wealth shares of domestic and foreign active traders remain
in the unit interval, ωh(z
t) ∈ [0, 1], ωf(z
t) ∈ [0, 1] for all zt.
Proof. If the short-sale constraints on equity positions, and the borrowing limit 2.3
is always satisfied for both domestic and foreign investors, we obtain that ωh(z
t) > 0
and ωf(z
t) > 0 for all zt. Since ωh(z
t) + ωf(z
t) = 1, the desired result follows
immediately.
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We can now rewrite the budget constraints for the domestic investors as:
ph(z
t)ch + pf(z
t)cf + qh(z
t)θ′h + qf (z
t)θ′f + qb(z
t)b′ =
ωh(z
t)I˜(zt) + (1− k)wh(zt)ph(z
t)
Intuitively, the right-hand side of this equation, which determines the resources
available to the consumer in node zt, depends only on the current realization of the
exogenous shock zt, equilibrium prices (which together determine the total wealth,
I˜(zt)) and the investor’s wealth share, ωh(z
t), but not on the consumer’s positions
in each of the three assets separately. We thus can expect that (ωh, z) ∈ [0, 1] × Z
can serve as a sufficient statistic for for the whole past history zt, so that we can use
them as state variables.
2.3 Inspecting the mechanism
To gain some insight into the investors’ incentives to hold the bond in our model, we
consider a simplified version of our model where the bond is the only asset that is
traded internationally, and investors hold all of the corresponding local stocks. To
understand the investors’ asset positions, we will use the indirect approach proposed
in Svensson (1988). The idea of this approach is to look at the value that the investors
attach to the asset before they participate in the financial markets13. Intuitively, the
investor that values the asset more before the trade will end up holding the asset.
Svensson (1988) shows that this intuition holds exactly in a 2-period model with only
1 asset, and holds as a tendency in a model with more assets.
13As a result of the trade in financial markets, the investors will choose their portfolios so that the
marginal values that they attach to each asset will be equalized. However, before the trade, they
will typically have different marginal valuations for the asset.
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The value of the asset to the investor depends both on the asset’s future stream
of payoffs, and the investor’s pricing kernel, which summarizes the investor’s needs
for income in different states of the world. In the appendix, we show that, after
going through the so-called “two-stage budgeting” procedure, the pricing kernel of
the domestic investor before the investors choose their asset positions for the next-
period can be expressed as:
Mh(z
t+1) =
(
πh(z
t+1)γ−1
(
ph(z
t+1)eh(z
z+t)
)−γ)
, (2.6)
where πh =
(
s
1/(1−ρ)
h p
ρ/(ρ−1)
h + s
1/(1−ρ)
f p
ρ/(ρ−1)
f
)(ρ−1)/ρ
is the consumption-based do-
mestic pricing index (home CPI), and pheh is the market value of the domestic in-
vestor’s labor income. Similarly, foreign investor’s pricing kernel (before the trade in
financial markets) is:
Mf(z
t+1) =
(
πf (z
t+1)γ−1
(
pf (z
t+1)ef (z
t+1)
)−γ)
. (2.7)
The value of the bond to the domestic investor is:
qhb (z
t) =
β
Mh(zt)
[
E
(
Mh(z
t+1)|zt
)
E
(
rb(z
t+1)|zt
)
+ Cov
(
Mh(z
t+1), rb(z
t+1)|zt
) ]
,
with a similar expression for the foreign investor, qfb .
The first term inside the square brackets can be interpreted as the present dis-
counted value of the bond’s payoffs to the investor. The second term shows the
covariance, or “hedging” value of the bond’s payoffs. It depends on how well-adapted
the stream of bond’s payoffs is to the investor’s needs (expressed by the pricing kernel).
For developing the intuition, we begin by considering the case where both investors
start the period with equal wealth, and where the output in both countries has the
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same volatility. In this case, the first term in the above asset-pricing equation will be
the same for both investors, and the investors will differ only in their covariance (or
“hedging”) value of the bond’s payoffs.
Equation 2.6 shows that domestic investor’s pricing kernel has two parts – one that
contains the domestic CPI, and the other one that contains the domestic investor’s
labor income. With home bias in consumption (sh > 0.5), domestic bonds have a
positive hedging value against the domestic CPI shocks (assuming γ > 1), and its
magnitude depends on the variance of the goods’ prices. At the same time, since the
bond’s payoffs are denominated in terms of the same good as the domestic investor’s
next-period income, the bond will have a negative hedging value for the domestic
investor against the fluctuations in his income. As we show next, the overall hedging
value of the bond depends on both the variance of the relative goods’ prices, and their
covariance with the domestic output.
Using a linear approximation of the pricing kernel, Mh = π
γ−1
h (pheh)
−γ, around
p¯h = p¯f and e¯h = E(eh), we get:
Cov(Mh, rb) ≈ C1 ((γ − 1)(2x− 1)− γ) V ar(ph)− C2Cov(eh, ph), (2.8)
where:
x =
s
1/(1−ρ)
h
s
1/(1−ρ)
h + (1− sh)
1/(1−ρ)
∈ (1/2, 1), given 1/2 < sh < 1,
C1 =
π¯γ−1h (w¯hp¯h)
−γ
p¯h
> 0, and C2 = C1
p¯h
e¯h
> 0.
With the home bias in consumption, the term ((γ − 1)(2x− 1)− γ) is negative
for all parameter values, making the bond undesirable for domestic investors. At the
same time, Cov(eh, ph) < 0 since higher relative output of the domestic good in our
model leads to a decrease in domestic good’s price, making the bond more desirable
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for the domestic investor. As a result, the investors’ position in the bond will depend
crucially on 3 things: the volatility of relative goods’ prices (or terms of trade), their
covariance with the output shocks, and the size of the home consumption bias. We
will calibrate our model so that it is consistent with the data along these 3 dimensions,
and will show that in such an environment, the domestic investor borrows using the
bond.
In addition to this, when the volatility of output shocks is higher abroad, the
volatility of foreign investor’s labor income will also be higher. Because of the pre-
cautionary savings motive, this gives the foreign investor an additional incentive to
save using the relatively safer asset, the bond.
2.4 Computing the equilibrium
One popular approach to solving the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models
is to use the so-called local perturbations approach14, when one uses the informa-
tion about the solution to the system of equations that characterize the equilibrium
at some particular given point and their first, second and potentially higher-order
derivatives at that point to obtain an approximation to the equilibrium policy and
pricing functions in the form of a Taylor series.
Judd & Jinn (2002) discuss two cases when the application of the perturbation
approach is problematic: 1) models with portfolio choice, 2) models where the dis-
tribution of wealth may matter. The model that we use contains both of these
complications. In both cases, the problem is created by the fact that the steady state
solution of the deterministic version of the model (which is typically used as a point
of approximation) is not locally unique. The intuition for why this problem arises in
14Judd (1998) and Judd & Jinn (2002) provide an excellent introduction to this method.
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the first case, with portfolio choice, is straightforward – in a deterministic version of
the model without shocks, all assets become perfect substitutes, and the agents are
indifferent between any portfolio shares. To understand the problem in the second
case, one can consider a simplified version of our model with only one consumption
good and one asset that is traded between the countries. Equilibrium in this case
is characterized by the following 6 equations (the two Euler equations, two budget
constraints and two laws of motion for exogenous output shocks):
qb,tu
′
h(ch,t) = βEt (u
′
h(ch,t+1)) ,
qb,tu
′
f(cf,t) = βEt
(
u′f(cf,t+1)
)
,
qb,tbh,t+1 + ch,t = eh,t + bh,t,
−qb,tbh,t+1 + cf,t = ef,t − bf,t,
log(eh,t+1) = ρ log(eh,t) + ǫh,t,
log(ef,t+1) = ρ log(ef,t) + ǫf,t.
In a stationary deterministic version of this model, the two Euler equations become
identical (since ch,t+1 = ch,t and cf,t+1 = cf,t), and the steady state solution for
four equilibrium variables,
(
bssh , c
ss
h , c
ss
f , q
ss
b
)
, is characterized by only 3 independent
equations:
qssb = β,
qssb b
ss
h + c
ss
h = 1 + b
ss
h ,
−qssb b
ss
h + c
ss
f = 1− b
ss
h ,
As a result, there will be a continuum of possible steady state solutions.
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The existence of the continuum of steady state solution makes it difficult to per-
form the first step of the algorithm, which fixes the constant terms of the policy and
pricing functions. In addition, we have also found that even if one arbitrarily chooses
one of the steady states as the approximation point, the algorithm often runs into
difficulties performing the second step – finding the linear approximation to the solu-
tion of the deterministic version of the model around this steady state, as the number
of stable eigenvalues in the linearized version of the model is smaller than the number
of control variables15.
Tille & Van Wincoop (2010) and Devereux & Sutherland (2006) address the first
problem related to the portfolio choice. They develop algorithm that can choose one of
the continuum of steady state portfolios by using different orders of approximation for
different equations that describe the equilibrium (a higher order for Euler equations
compared to the rest of the equilibrium system).
Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2003) suggest several ways to deal with the second prob-
lem – existence of continuum of steady state wealth distributions in a small open
economy model, which can be applied in our model as well. However, these suggested
solutions essentially arbitrarily choose one of the continuum of possible steady state
wealth distributions, and penalize the agents for deviating from them. In this case,
it is hard to say whether the long-run predictions of the model are driven by the fea-
tures of the underlying model, or the fix itself. To illustrate this problem, we use the
simplified one-good one-asset version of our model described above. We also assume
that domestic agents are less risk-averse than foreigners (we set the parameter γ that
controls the relative risk aversion at 2 for domestic consumers, and at 3 for foreign-
ers). One could expect that precautionary motives would lead to domestic agents
15To find the local perturbation solution, we used the code described in Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe
(2004). Klein (2000) describes the conditions that guarantee existence and determinacy of the
solution to the linear rational expectations models.
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accumulating negative bond holdings over the long run in this case. To induce the
uniqueness of the of the steady state distribution of wealth, we introduce convex costs
of holding a non-zero bond position (Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2003) call it “portfolio
adjustment costs”), specified as:
Cost(b) =
κ
2
b2.
Table 2.1 shows the long-run simulated means implied by the solution to the
model using the projection approach, and using perturbations with different values of
κ (column 2). These means are obtained using one long simulation with several million
draws of the vector of exogenous shocks (figure 2.4 shows the simulated distributions).
It also reports the simulated autocorrelation and standard deviation of bond position
of country h, obtained by averaging over several thousand shorter simulations (with
the length of each simulation equal to T = 100 periods) in columns 3 and 4. As is clear
from the table, the long-run predictions obtained using the perturbation approach
depends crucially on the magnitude of the portfolio adjustment costs16. Compared
to the projection solution, they underpredict the magnitude of the negative bond
position for high values of κ, and overpredict it for low values of κ. For values of
κ smaller than 3−5, the simulations based on the model solution eventually diverge
to infinity, failing to produce a long-run distribution. Columns 3 and 4 show that
the short-run behavior is less affected by the magnitude of κ, but it differs from that
predicted by the projection solution.
We avoid these complications by using the projection method17. In addition, the
solution obtained by using the projection method is designed to be globally accurate
16In this toy model, the steady state value of output in both countries is equal to 1. Thus, the
average values of bond holdings reported in column 2 can be though of as the long-run debt-to-GDP
ratio.
17See Judd (1998), chapter 11 for an excellent introduction to these methods.
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Table 2.1: Simulated average bond holdings
Solution Method Mean(bh) Corr(bh,t, bh,t+1) σ(bh)
Projection −0.178 0.924 0.080
Perturbation, κ = 1−3 −0.011 0.982 0.0123
Perturbation, κ = 5−4 −0.021 0.984 0.0121
Perturbation, κ = 4−5 −0.355 0.985 0.0117
Perturbation, κ = 3−5 −0.553 0.985 0.0117
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Figure 2.4: Simulated distributions of bond holdings
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for all values of the state space, not only in some neighborhood of the point of
approximation, as is in the case of local perturbations. We provide a more detailed
description of the algorithm in appendix 2.8.3, while here we only outline its main
features. We project the policy and pricing functions into the space of piecewise
polynomials (splines). We start with some initial guess, and update the polynomial
coefficients by solving the system of non-linear equations that describe the first-order
optimality and market clearing conditions (described in details in the appendix) at
each point on some predetermined grid over the state space, [0, 1] × Z, and iterate
until convergence.
Portfolio constraints can lead to non-differentiable policy functions, and the lo-
cation of the kinks are not known a priori. To deal with this complication, we use
several hundred grid points over [0, 1]. Another complication is that the portfolio
constraints introduce inequalities (through Kuhn-Tucker complementarity conditions)
into the system of temporal equilibrium conditions. We deal with this by using the
“Garcia-Zangwill” trick (described in detail in Garcia & Zangwill (1981)). It es-
sentially transforms the Kuhn-Tucker inequalities into equalities by an appropriate
change of variables. We provide a brief explanation of how it works in the appendix.
The algorithm was implemented in Fortran 90. The code is available upon request
18.
We test the performance of our numerical algorithm in a special case of our model,
where trade in two stocks is enough to achieve an efficient allocation, and we can de-
scribe the solution analytically. The results, which are provided in appendix 2.8.4,
suggest that the numerical algorithm that we use produces a very accurate approx-
imation to both the policy functions, and the ergodic distribution of the model (at
18To solve the non-linear system of equilibrium equations, we used two non-linear solvers: HYBRD
and KNITRO (more robust).
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least in this special case).
2.5 Calibration
In section 2.3, we show that the investors’ position in the bond depends crucially
on the volatility of the relative goods’ prices (or terms of trade), their correlation
with the output shocks, and the degree of the home bias. We calibrate our model
so that it is consistent with the data along these three dimensions. To implement
this calibration strategy, we need the data for the terms of trade. Because of the
data availability limitations, we concentrate on the OECD economies. Thus, in our
calibrated model, country 2 (“Foreign”) stands for all OECD economies except the
U.S. We are interested in the period since 1985, because it coincides with the period
of increased international capital flows.
Data sources. We use the national income accounts data from the OECD.Stat
database. Since we abstract from the government expenditures and the investment
in the physical capital, we use the data for the final consumption expenditures of
the households (series P31S14) plus net export (series B11) as our measure of out-
put. Similar to Backus, Kehoe & Kydland (1994) and Stockman & Tesar (1995), we
measure terms of trade as the ratio of the implicit price deflator for imports to the
implicit price deflator for exports, where the deflators are computed as the ratios of
current-price imports and exports to base-year-price imports and exports.
We also use Robert Shiller’s dataset for the U.S. stock market dividends, and
the dataset compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti for the countries’ net foreign asset
positions and portfolio composition.
Output processes. We use HP-filtered series for consumption and net export
(C+NX) for the U.S. and the rest of the OECD economies during the 1985-2007
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period to construct the process for the output shocks in our two model economies.
To obtain a measure of output volatility in our country 2 (“Foreign”), we compute
a weighted average of standard deviations of our measure of output in each of the
OECD country (except the U.S.), using the corresponding country’s average share
in total output as the weight. We find that the output abroad was about 1.5 times
more volatile than in the U.S. during this period. Table 2.2 provides the details. It
also shows that we find a similar difference in output volatilities if we use the growth
rates of output instead of the HP-filtered series. Table 2.7 in the appendix provides
more details for each of the country in our sample.
HP-filtered series Growth rate series
std(yust ),% 0.984 0.881
std(yrowt ),% 1.506 1.536
corr(yust , y
row
t ) 0.127 0.131
corr(yust , y
us
t−1) 0.659 0.369
corr(yrowt , y
row
t−1 ) 0.619 0.364
Table 2.2: Summary statistics for the output processes in the U.S. and the rest of the
OECD countries (RoW)
We assume that the output in our two model economies follows a bivariate VAR
process, and approximate it with a discrete first-order Markov process with 9 states
(3 for each country), using the approach described in Knotek & Terry (2008)19.
An alternative way to obtain a measure of the volatility of output for our second
model economy would be to first construct the total output for the rest of the world
as the sum of the outputs of all individual RoW countries in our sample, and then
compute its volatility. However, such total output for RoW turns out to be less
volatile than the output in the U.S. (with std(ytot rowhp ) = 0.56%), despite the fact that
for all individual countries in our sample except one (France), output is more volatile
19This approach implements a bivariate version of the Tauchen discretization procedure using
Monte Carlo simulation to compute the cell probabilities.
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than in the U.S. (see table 2.7 in the appendix for more details)20.
Dividends. Since we lack the data for the stock dividends for many countries in
our sample, we will use the U.S. data to calibrate the dividend process. In particular,
we use the data on the dividends accruing to the S&P Composite Stock Market Index
from Robert Shiller’s dataset. Figure 2.5 shows the joint behavior of dividends and
our measure of output in the U.S. over the last four decades.
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Figure 2.5: Dividends and output in the U.S.
The figure shows that since the mid-80s, there has been a reduction in the volatility
of output in the U.S., which was not accompanied by a similar reduction in the
volatility of many financial variables. In particular, stock dividends remained as
(or even more) volatile as before 1985. As a result, during the 1985-2007 period,
the dividends were significantly more volatile than our measure of output, and the
correlation between the two was close to zero. Table 2.3 provides the details.
We choose the dividends in both countries to match the following 3 moments: (1)
20This second approach for measuring output volatility for the rest of the world implicitly assumes
that individual output shocks are perfectly hedged between the RoW countries. We make the other
extreme assumption that the RoW countries cannot hedge their shocks bileterally among themselves
at all.
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HP-filtered series Growth rate series
std(dt)/std(yt) 6.25 4.35
corr(dt, yt) −0.02 −0.03
Table 2.3: Dividends and output in the U.S.
the relative volatility of dividends compared to volatility of output, σ(dt)/σ(yt) =
6.25, (2) the correlation between dividends and output, ρ(dt, yt) = −0.02 and (3)
the average dividend share, E
(
dt
yt
)
= 0.05 (to match the average ratio of corporate
dividends to our measure of output in the U.S.).
Taste shocks and other parameters. As we mentioned in section 2.2.1, to account
for the behavior of relative goods’ prices, we follow Stockman & Tesar (1995) and
introduce taste shocks, as a reduced-form way to model the demand-side shocks. We
assume that the preference weights in both countries, sh and sf , are stochastic, and
take on one of the two possible values, s¯i + ǫ and s¯i − ǫ. We assume that taste
shocks are i.i.d., independent of the output shocks in both countries. We choose the
variance of the taste shocks (by choosing ǫ), the average degree of the home bias in
consumption (by choosing s¯h and s¯f) and ρ to match the relative volatility of terms
of trade to output, the correlation between the terms of trade and output, and the
share of trade in output (as measured by 0.5(Im+X)
C+X−Im
) in our OECD sample21
We set the value of the discount factor β to 0.96, which gives us the annual interest
rate of 4%, and set the value of γ (the parameter in the CRRA instantaneous utility
function) to 2.
Table 2.4 summarizes our choice of all the parameters.
21We choose to match the trade share for the U.S. (16.3%). The average weighted trade share
for all countries in our sample is equal to 29.9%. Matching this higher trade share increases the
negative position of the domestic country in the bond.
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Value Moment/Source
std(eust ) 0.01 Volatility of output in US
std(erowt ) 0.015 Volatility of output in rest of OECD
corr(et, et−1) 0.64 Persistence of output, OECD
corr(eust , e
row
t ) 0.12 Cross-country correlation of output
E(dt/et) 0.05 Corporate dividends/Output Ratio, US
β 0.96 Return on bond = 4%
σ 2.00 Common benchmark value
s¯ 0.616 Trade/Output in US = 0.5(X +M)/(C +NX) = 16.3%
ρ 0.71 std(terms of trade)/std(output), OECD
std(ǫ)/std(eh) 0.74 corr(terms of trade,output), OECD
Table 2.4: Parameter values
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Numerical results
In this section, we report our numerical results. We consider 2 versions of our model:
- Model M1. A model with the exorbitant privilege in the bond market, but the
same volatility of output in the two countries.
- Model M2. A model with both the exorbitant privilege and smaller volatility of
output in home country.
In model M1, we assume that the bond pays a unit of domestic good, but the two
output processes in both countries are equally volatile (we set the standard deviation
of output in both countries to 0.0125, which is the weighted average for all countries in
our sample, including the U.S.). In other words, we switch off the different volatilities
channel, and study the impact of the exorbitant privilege channel separately on our
results. In model M2, we assume that both of our channels are operative, and we set
all the model parameters to the values reported in table 2.4.
Figure 2.6 plots the simulated ergodic distributions from models M1 and M2, and
compares them to the distribution generated by the fully symmetric model SYM (in
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which both the exorbitant privilege and different volatility channels are turned off).
We use these simulated ergodic distributions to compute all the models’ summary
statistics that we report below.
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Figure 2.6: Simulated ergodic distributions
In both models M1 and M2, the ergodic distribution is skewed to the left, with
domestic economy having a lower financial wealth in the long-run. Table 2.5 shows
that this is caused by the large negative NFA position of the domestic economy.
Table 2.5 compares the moments generated by our model to those in the data. The
NFA(h) position reported in the “Data” column corresponds to the U.S. NFA position
in two asset categories – equity and debt, as a percentage of C+NX (our measure of
output), in 2007, computed using the data in Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The table
shows that the exorbitant privilege alone generates a large negative NFA position for
the domestic country, close to a half of the negative NFA position observed for the
U.S. Adding smaller output volatility in the home country amplifies this result, and
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generates a negative NFA position slightly higher than the one observed in the U.S.
in 2007.
Table 2.5: Simulated and data moments
Data M1 M2
NFA(h)/output(h) −38% −23% −43%
Wealth share, country H (ω(h)) n.a. 0.47 0.44
Domestic portfolio shares:
Domestic stocks, µ(θh) 1.01 0.77 0.93
Foreign stocks, µ(θf ) 0.32 0.54 0.58
Bond, µ(b) −0.33 −0.31 −0.50
Calibrated moments:
std(terms of trade)/std(output) 1.962 1.994 1.901
corr(terms of trade,output) 0.187 0.191 0.187
Trade/output 0.163 0.167 0.164
Backus-Smith 0.075 0.966 0.969
Home Bias 0.761 0.588 0.616
Table 2.5 also reports portfolio shares for the domestic investor. The share of
domestic stocks, for example, is defined as:
µ(θh) =
qhθh
qhθh + qfθf + qbb
,
and similarly for foreign stocks and the bond. To compute these shares in the data,
we combine the Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2007) dataset with the data on countries’
stock market capitalizations from the World Bank dataset22. To compute portfolio
22This data is available on-line at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD.
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shares in the data, we calculate:
qhθh = U.S. Stock Market Capitalization − U.S. Portfolio Equity Liabilities,
qfθf = U.S. Portfolio Equity Assets,
qbb = U.S. Debt Assets − U.S. Debt Liabilities,
using the 2007 data.
Table 2.5 also shows that in all versions of our model, negative NFA of the domestic
economy is associated with a large negative position in the bond, as is the case in the
data for the U.S.
To summarize our main findings, we obtain that:
Result 1. A country that can issue bonds in own currency accumulates on average
a sizable negative net foreign asset position in the long run. Similarly to what we find
in the data for the U.S., this is driven by a large negative position in the bond, which
is caused by the strong positive correlation between the bond’s payoff and domestic
labor income.
Result 2. A country with less volatile output shocks also accumulates a large
negative NFA position in the long run. Similarly to the previous result, this is driven
by a large negative position in the bond. In this case, the main cause is the larger
precautionary motive of foreign investors.
Table 2.5 also reveals that the predictions of our model in terms of the Backus-
Smith correlation (the correlation between the relative consumption growth rate, and
the real exchange rate changes in the two countries) are at odds with what we observe
in the data. Similarly, the share of stock holdings invested in domestic stocks (“Home
bias”) in our model is lower than in the data. We address these two issues in the
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following section.
2.6.2 Backus-Smith puzzle and home equity bias
To improve the ability of our model to match the data along the following two di-
mensions – low correlation between the growth rates of relative consumption and the
real exchange rate (the Backus-Smith puzzle), and a high share of equity holdings
invested into local stocks (home equity puzzle), we introduce two new features into
our model. To address the Backus-Smith puzzle, we follow Heathcote & Perri (2009)
and introduce discount factor shocks. In this new formulation, the discount factor in
country i becomes β˜ = β ∗ δi, where δi ∈ {e
σδ , e−σδ}. We assume that the discount
factor shocks are i.i.d., and we choose σδ which regulates the size of the shock to
match the Backus-Smith correlation. These discount factor shocks are observation-
ally equivalent to a model with heterogeneous beliefs – i.i.d. surges in optimism and
pessimism.
To obtain a measure of the Backus-Smith correlation in the data, we compute
the weighted average correlation between the growth rates in relative aggregate con-
sumption, and the ratio of the CPIs for each country in our OECD sample with the
U.S. during the 1985-2007 period, again using the countries’ relative output shares
as weights. The Backus-Smith correlation that we compute in this way is equal to
0.075, which we report in table 2.5.
To improve our results in terms of the home equity bias, we assume that investing
in the stock of another country entails a cost proportional to τ for the investor.
We assume that these costs are paid in terms of the local goods of the country
issuing the stock, and are rebated back to the local country’s investors as a lump-
sum. This means, for example, that domestic investors’ payoff from holding a foreign
stock is rf(1 − τpfef). If domestic investor chooses to hold θf in foreign stocks, the
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amount equal to τpfefθf is paid by domestic investors to foreign investors next period.
The assumption that the investment costs are rebated to local investors allow us to
compute a wealth-recursive equilibrium similar to the one defined in section 2.2.2,
with ωh now denoting the share of the worldwide investors’ wealth owned by the
domestic investors.
Table 2.6 reports our results from this modified model, where we keep both the
exorbitant privilege, and the lower volatility of output in domestic country assump-
tions (we call this version of the model M3). To match the Backus-Smith correlation
in the data, we need to set σδ, the parameter that controls the magnitude of the
discount factor shocks, to 0.0073. To generate realistic home bias in equity, we need
to introduce only very small investment costs proportional to τ = 16−6.
Table 2.6: Simulated and data moments
Data M3
NFA(h)/output(h) −38% −42%
Wealth share, country H (ω(h)) n.a. 0.44
Domestic portfolio shares:
Domestic stocks, µ(θh) 1.01 1.18
Foreign stocks, µ(θf ) 0.32 0.39
Bond, µ(b) −0.33 −0.57
Calibrated moments:
std(terms of trade)/std(output) 1.962 1.914
corr(terms of trade,output) 0.187 0.185
Trade/output 0.163 0.164
Backus-Smith 0.075 0.070
Home Bias 0.761 0.752
Table 2.6 shows that model M3 closely matches the data in terms of the home
equity bias and Backus-Smith correlation. At the same time, the results in terms
of the domestic country’s NFA position is similar to those obtained in model M2.
Domestic country borrows using the bond, which leads to a sizable negative NFA
position in the long run.
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2.7 Conclusions
In this paper, we develop and solve an incomplete-markets general equilibrium model
of international portfolio choice. We calibrate our model so that it is consistent with
the behavior of the relative goods’ prices, home equity bias and consumption-real
exchange rate disconnect (Backus-Smith puzzle), and use our calibrated model to
study the net foreign asset position and the structure of the international portfolio
in the U.S. We adapt the algorithm developed in Kubler & Schmedders (2003) to
obtain a globally accurate numerical approximation to our model’s equilibrium. We
use our model to study the impact of two features of economic environment on the
international portfolio structure and NFA position of the U.S.: 1) exorbitant privilege
– the ability of the U.S. to borrow internationally in its own domestic goods, and 2)
lower volatility of output shocks in the U.S. compared to the rest of the world. We
find that in our model, both of these two features contribute to generating a realistic
portfolio structure for the U.S., with a large negative position in the bond and a
sizable negative NFA position similar to what we find in the data.
The model and the global numerical solution method that we use are well-suited
for the analysis of the international portfolios in the presence of large shocks, such as
the 1998 Asian crisis or the slowdown of the output growth in Japan during the 90s.
We expect that the introduction of these features into our model can improve our
model’s predictions in terms of the equity premium puzzle, and generate sizable pos-
itive net factor payments to the U.S. that we see in the data. We plan to incorporate
these features into the model in our future research.
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2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Data
Figure 2.7: Annual Changes in Government Debt/GDP and NFA/GDP
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Figure 2.8: US Government Debt and NFA in Debt Instruments
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Figure 2.9: Annual Changes in Government Debt/GDP and NFA(debt)/GDP
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Table 2.7: Output volatilities, HP-filtered and growth
rate series
Country std(yihp),% std(y
i
∆),% Weight
AUS 2.096 2.375 0.025
AUT 1.444 1.633 0.011
BEL 1.133 1.257 0.014
CAN 2.453 2.108 0.045
DEN 1.218 1.718 0.009
FIN 2.428 2.316 0.007
FRA 0.905 0.751 0.082
GER 1.346 1.422 0.122
GRC 2.169 2.494 0.009
ICL 4.756 6.711 0.001
ITA 1.021 1.359 0.073
JAP 1.477 1.362 0.302
KOR 1.817 2.339 0.028
LUX 3.296 3.918 0.001
MEX 1.572 1.959 0.043
NRL 1.522 1.753 0.022
NZL 2.142 2.808 0.003
NOR 2.199 2.705 0.010
POR 1.699 1.604 0.007
SPN 1.027 0.951 0.036
Continued on next page
41
Table 2.7 – continued from previous page
Country std(yihp),% std(y
i
∆),% Weight
SWE 1.799 2.071 0.014
CHE 1.942 2.050 0.018
TUR 2.401 2.944 0.019
GBR 1.645 1.460 0.098
USA 0.984 0.881 n.a.
Figure 2.10: Share of domestic stocks in U.S. equity portfolio
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2.8.2 Two-stage budgeting
The two-stage budgeting procedure separates the overall optimization problem of the
investor into the static and the dynamic parts. The dynamic part deals with the
reallocation of the investor’s income across time and states of the world, through
participation in the financial markets. In the static part, the investor decides on how
to spend the income available to him in each date-event node on the consumption
goods, by participating in the spot markets.
Let’s start with the static problem. Suppose that the domestic consumer has some
amount of income c˜h that he can spend on consumption in some date-event node. To
decide how to spend this income on the two consumption goods, he solves:
max
(
shc
ρ
h + sfc
ρ
f
)1/ρ
s.t. phch + pfcf = c˜h.
The solution to this problem is:
(
cmaxh , c
max
f
)
=
(
c˜h
ph + pf
(
(sfph)/(shpf)
)1/(1−ρ) , c˜h
pf + ph
(
(shpf)/(sfph)
)1/(1−ρ)
)
.
This produces the indirect utility from income:
vh(c˜h|ph, pf) = g(c
max
h , c
max
f ) = c˜h/πh(ph, pf),
where π(ph, pf) =
(
s
1/(1−ρ)
h p
ρ/(ρ−1)
h +s
1/(1−ρ)
f p
ρ/(ρ−1)
f
)1−1/ρ
is the domestic consumption-
based price aggregator (domestic CPI). We can substitute it into 2.1, and rewrite
the dynamic problem as:
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maxE
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(c˜h/πh)
1−γ
1− γ
∣∣∣I0], (2.9)
subject to the sequence of budget constraints:
c˜h(z
t) + qh(z
t)θh(z
t) + qf(z
t)θf(z
t) + qb(z
t)b(zt) = Ih(z
t)
We get that the marginal utility of income, or the pricing kernel of this consumer,
is Mh = (πh)
γ−1c˜−γh . Before the investor chooses his portfolio for the next period, his
income next period consists of only his labor income, so that c˜h = whph. In the case
when the bond is the only asset that is traded internationally, and investors hold the
entire supply of local stocks, their next-period income is equal to the market value of
the total domestic good’s output, c˜h = ehph. This gives us the expression in 2.6.
2.8.3 Numerical algorithm
We approximate the policy and price functions with splines. We experimented with
both cubic and piecewise linear splines, which produced practically identical solutions,
and we ultimately chose piecewise linear functions for speed considerations. Since
our model has only 2 countries, our endogenous state variable, wealth share, can be
represented with a single number, ω ∈ [0, 1]. We form a grid M over [0, 1], and
start with an initial guess for the policy and price functions, f 0. Good choice of f 0
is important for both convergence and speed of the algorithm. We choose either a
solution to the static (“last-period”) problem, or a solution for a “nearby” economy
as our guess.
Given the function fn−1 that determines the behavior of the economy next period,
we obtain a new function fn by solving the following system of static and short-term
dynamic optimality conditions (“expectations correspondence”) + the “law of motion
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for wealth share” equation for each gridpoint (ω, z) ∈M × Z:
pf/ph = (sf/sh)(ch/cf)
1−ρ = (s∗f/s
∗
h)(c
∗
h/c
∗
f)
1−ρ, (2.10)
qh = βEz+
(
λn−1h (ω
+, z+)
λh
rn−1h (ω
+, z+)
)
+ φh, (2.11)
qh = βEz+
(
λn−1f (ω
+, z+)
λf
rn−1h (ω
+, z+)
)
+ φ∗h, (2.12)
qf = βEz+
(
λn−1h (ω
+, z+)
λh
rn−1f (ω
+, z+)
)
+ φf , (2.13)
qf = βEz+
(
λn−1f (ω
+, z+)
λf
rn−1f (ω
+, z+)
)
+ φ∗f , (2.14)
qb = βEz+
(
λn−1h (ω
+, z+)
λh
rn−1b (ω
+, z+)
)
+ ν
∂Bh(b)
∂b
, (2.15)
qb = βEz+
(
λn−1f (ω
+, z+)
λf
rn−1b (ω
+, z+)
)
+ ν∗
∂Bf (b
∗)
∂b∗
, (2.16)
φh ≥ 0, θh ≥ 0, φhθh = 0, (2.17)
φf ≥ 0, θf ≥ 0, φfθf = 0, (2.18)
φ∗h ≥ 0, θ
∗
h ≥ 0, φ
∗
hθ
∗
h = 0, (2.19)
φ∗f ≥ 0, θ
∗
f ≥ 0, φ
∗
fθ
∗
f = 0, (2.20)
ν ≥ 0, Bh(b) ≥ 0, νBh(b) = 0, (2.21)
ν∗ ≥ 0, Bf (b
∗) ≥ 0, ν∗Bf (b
∗) = 0, (2.22)
I˜ = k(whph + wfpf) + rh + rf , (2.23)
phch + pfcf + qhθh + qfθf + qbb = ωI˜ + (1− k)whph, (2.24)
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phc
∗
h + pfc
∗
f + qhθ
∗
h + qfθ
∗
f + qbb
∗ = (1− ω)I˜ + (1− k)wfpf , (2.25)
λh = g
1−ρ−γ
h
(
shc
ρ−1
h + sfc
ρ−1
f
)
(2.26)
λf = g
1−ρ−γ
f
(
s∗h(c
∗
h)
ρ−1 + s∗f(c
∗
f)
ρ−1
)
(2.27)
ph + pf = 1 (2.28)
ch + c
∗
h = eh (2.29)
θh + θ
∗
h = 1, θf + θ
∗
f = 1, b+ b
∗ = 0 (2.30)
ω+ =
rn−1h (ω
+, z+)θh + r
n−1
f (ω
+, z+)θh + r
n−1
b (ω
+, z+)b+ kwh(z
+)pn−1h (ω
+, z+)
rn−1h (ω
+, z+) + rn−1f (ω
+, z+) + k
(
wh(z+)p
n−1
h (ω
+, z+) + wf(z+)p
n−1
f (ω
+, z+)
)
(2.31)
Equation 2.10 is the static optimality condition. Equations 2.11 – 2.16 are short-term
dynamic optimality (Euler) equations. Equations 2.17 – 2.22 are Kuhn-Tucker com-
plementarity conditions. Equation 2.23 defines total financial wealth. Equations 2.24,
2.25 are the budget constraints. Equations 2.26 and 2.27 define marginal utility of
income for domestic and foreign investors. Equation 2.28 is a price normalization.
Equations 2.29 and 2.30 are market-clearing conditions. Finally, equation 2.31 im-
plicitly defines next-period wealth share ω+ as a function of today’s portfolio choices.
Note that λn−1h , λ
n−1
f , r
n−1
h = q
n−1
h + p
n−1
h dh, r
n−1
f = q
n−1
f + p
n−1
f df , r
n−1
b =
αpn−1h + (1 − α)p
n−1
f , p
n−1
h and p
n−1
f are components of f
n−1. Also, note that Bh(b)
and Bf(b
∗) are the borrowing limits defined in 2.3.
We keep updating the policy and pricing functions until ||fn−fn−1|| < ǫ for some
small ǫ > 0.
Garcia-Zangwill trick. Kuhn-Tucker complementarity conditions that involve in-
equalities can be transformed into equalities using the so-called Garcia-Zangwill trick.
It is basically a change of variables. We will demonstrate how it works using the bor-
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rowing limit and the optimality condition for the bond holdings. Fix some positive
integer k ≥ 2 and define
α+ = (max[0, α])k, α− = (max[0,−α])k
Note that α+ ≥ 0, α− ≥ 0 and α+α− = 0. We can now reformulate the Euler
equation and Kuhn-Tucker conditions of domestic consumer for bonds as follows:
qb = βEz+
(
λn−1h (ω
+, z+)
λh
rn−1b (ω
+, z+)
)
+ α+
∂Bh(b)
∂b
α− − Bh(b) = 0
Similarly, we can transform all other Kuhn-Tucker conditions into equalities.
2.8.4 Testing the algorithm: a special case with analytic so-
lution
To check the performance of our algorithm, we consider a special case of our model
where we can characterize the solution analytically. We show that our numerical
solution produces a very good approximation to the analytic solution in this case.
Consider the model that we described in section 2.2, with the following modifica-
tions (Model LSR23.):
1. Consumers in both countries have identical preferences towards the two con-
sumption goods. In particular, we will assume that the preference weights for
both consumers are fixed at sh(z) = s
∗
h(z) = 1/2 for all z
24.
23The consumption allocation in the one-good version of this model is known in the general
equilibrium literature as the “linear sharing rule (LSR)” (see Magill & Quinzii (1996), p. 173)
24Intuitively, with this assumption the model behaves as a model with only one consumption good.
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2. The “wages” and the “dividends” are some fixed fractions of the output in both
countries, so that wh(z) = νeh(z) and wf(z) = νef (z) for some ν ∈ [0, 1) for all
z (which implies that dh(z) = (1− ν)eh(z) and df(z) = (1− ν)ef (z)).
3. The initial portfolio distribution (or, alternatively, the initial wealth share of
the home country, ωh(z0)) is such that the short-selling constraints are not
be binding at the solution that we present next (the precise meaning of this
assumption will become clear when we present the solution).
The exact values for all other parameters in the model (ρ, σ, β and the specification
of the two output processes) are not important for this example, but we will set them
equal to the values from our calibrated model in section 2.5. We will assume that
ν = 0.1. On one hand, assuming a low share of labor income in total output will
ensure that the short-selling constraints are not binding for a large portion of our
state space. On the other hand, given our borrowing limit, assuming that labor share
is zero would trivially imply a zero bond position, which we would like to avoid for
the purpose of this exercise.
Proposition 2.8.1. The model that satisfies assumptions “Model LSR” has an equi-
librium with the following consumption allocation (which is Pareto optimal):
cPOh (z) = keh(z), c
PO
f (z) = kef (z),
c∗POh (z) = (1− k)eh(z), c
∗PO
f = (1− k)ef (z)
where k = 1/
(
1 +
[
1−µpo
µpo
]1/σ)
and µpo is the weight that the planner assigns to the
domestic consumer (which depends on ωh(z0)), and the following time-invariant port-
folio allocation:
θPOh =
k − ν
1− ν
, θPOf =
k
1− ν
, bPO = 0,
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θPO∗h =
k
1− ν
, θPO∗f =
k − ν
1− ν
, bPO∗ = 0,
It is easy to check that (cPOh , c
PO
f , c
∗PO
h , c
∗PO
f ) is indeed Pareto optimal, by verifying
that it satisfies the first-order conditions in the planner’s problem. It is also easy
to check that the suggested consumption and portfolio allocations satisfy the budget
constraints for both consumers at each note zt. Finally, one can set the relative prices
to be equal to the appropriate ratios of marginal utilities of either of the consumers,
and check that the first-order conditions in the consumer’s optimization problem
are satisfied. Note that the Pareto weight µpo depends on the initial distribution of
wealth between the consumers (it must be chosen so that the budget constraints are
satisfied). We need to assume that the initial wealth distribution is such that the
predicted equity positions are non-negative (θPOh > 0, θ
PO
f > 0, θ
PO∗
h > 0, θ
PO∗
f > 0),
so that the short-selling constraints are satisfied. The predicted bond positions are
identically zero, so that the borrowing limits are satisfied.
Note that our portfolio allocation in this case is the same as in Baxter & Jermann
(1997), who consider the model with one consumption good and Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction functions (which produce the result that wages and dividends are constant
fractions of output). If ν = 0 (no non-traded income), we get θPOh = θ
PO
f = k and
θPO∗h = θ
PO∗
f = (1 − k), so that both consumers should hold only a fixed share in
a mutual fund that fully owns both equities. If ν > 0, domestic consumers should
reduce their exposure to domestic equity and increase their position in foreign equity.
Proposition 2.8.1 describes portfolio positions for a given Pareto weight µpo. For
every initial exogenous state z0 and every initial wealth share wh(z0), we can find µ
po
numerically using the Negishi algorithm, as described in Judd et al. (2000).
Figure 2.11 compares the equity and bond positions obtained by our numerical
solution with the ones from proposition 2.8.1. The upper part of the figure shows
49
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Country 1 wealth share
Equity positions
 
 
θ1
θ2
θpo1
θpo2
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Country 1 wealth share
Bond positions
 
 
b
bpo
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
1
2
3
x 10−4 | θ − θpo |
Country 1 wealth share
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
1
2
x 10−4 | b − bpo |
Country 1 wealth share
Figure 2.11: Numerical and analytic portfolios for Model LS
the two portfolio solutions over the whole state space, and the lower part shows the
absolute difference between the two solutions (only the part of the state space where
the short-sale constraints do not bind is shown). This figure demonstrates that our
numerical solution is very close to the analytic solution.
Next, we compare the simulated stationary distributions of our endogenous state
variable, ωh, and simulated portfolio positions (with several million draws of the
exogenous shock). We simulate the model assuming that ωh(z0) = 0.5. We can
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expect that ωh should stay close to 0.5. In fact, from proposition 2.8.1 it follows that
there should be finitely many realized values for ωh, equal to the number of exogenous
states25.
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Figure 2.12: Stationary distributions of endogenous state variable
Figure 2.12 confirms that the stationary distribution obtained from our numerical
solution is very close to the distribution implied by the analytic solution. Table 2.8
shows that the predicted portfolio positions are also very close to the ones from
proposition 2.8.1.
We conclude that our numerical algorithm provides a very good approximation to
both the policy functions, and the implied stationary distribution over ωh.
25From the definition in 2.5, it is clear that ωh depends on the selected portfolio positions, goods’
and assets’ prices and wage and dividend realizations. Proposition 2.8.1 shows that portfolio posi-
tions should not change over time. It also shows that the consumption allocations, and thus all the
prices will be “strongly stationary” (will depend only on the realization of the exogenous state). It
follows that ωh will also depend only on the realization of the exogenous state.
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Numerical solution (PO) solution
mean(ωh) 0.5000 0.5000
mean(θh) 0.4444 0.4444
mean(θf ) 0.5556 0.5556
mean(b) 0.0000 0.0000
Table 2.8: Simulated portfolio allocation
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Chapter 3
Marriage Stability, Taxation and
Aggregate Labor Supply in the US
vs. Europe
3.1 Introduction
It is a well-known empirical finding that aggregate labor supply is higher in the United
States than in Europe and that there is also substantial variation among European
countries, see for instance Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2006). Rogerson (2006)
notes that these differences are an order of magnitude larger than the fluctuations at
business cycle frequencies in post-WWII US data, and thus deserve serious attention.
Are the differences in hours worked due to public policies or are they due to other
fundamental differences between societies?
In this paper, we start by using micro level data to document the contribution of
various demographic groups to the aggregate differences between the US and 8 Eu-
ropean countries. We find that among the demographic groups that we consider, the
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largest contribution comes from women – in most European countries, women work
substantially less than in the United States, while the difference in hours worked
between European and American men is smaller, and in some cases practically non-
existent. This is especially true for married women, but also holds for single women,
and for women with and without children. We also document a negative cross-country
correlation between tax level and labor supply, and a positive correlation between di-
vorce rates and labor supply across countries and across time. Divorce rates are,
however, in particular correlated with female labor supply. Motivated by these ob-
servations, we consider the following two potential driving forces for cross-country
differences in labor supply: 1) cross-country differences in taxation; 2) cross-country
differences in marriage stability.
To quantitatively assess the impact of taxes and marriage stability on labor sup-
ply we develop a life-cycle, overlapping-generations model with heterogeneous agents,
marriage, and divorce. There are three types of households; single males, single fe-
males and married households. Divorces and marriages occur stochastically. The
main channel through which individual divorce and singlehood rates impact labor
supply is by reducing the implicit insurance of marriage, and thereby providing in-
centives for individuals to invest in experience accumulation. We calibrate our model
to US data and study how labor supply in the US changes as we introduce divorce
and marriage probabilities and tax systems from other countries. We find that the
effect of making marriages more stable is a reduction in labor supply. This effect is
particularly strong for female labor supply, because the woman is usually the lower
earner in a married couple. Changing the US probabilities of marriage and divorce
to their European equivalents accounts on average for 22% of the difference in hours
worked between the US and 11 European countries. When we introduce European
taxes and redistribute the increase in taxes evenly to all households, we can account
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for 19% of the difference in hours worked between the US and the average of the
European countries. If the increased tax revenues from European taxation is not
redistributed the average effect is an increase in labor supply. When using both the
divorce and marriage probabilities and tax systems from the European countries, the
model can on average account for 28% of the difference in hour worked between the
US and Europe.
Cross-Country Differences in Labor Supply: Possible Explanations and Previous Lit-
erature
The economic literature has proposed several potential explanations for the observed
cross-country differences in aggregate labor supply. Taxes have been suggested as a
major contributor to the differences in labor supply by Prescott (2004) and Rogerson
(2006), who used an infinite horizon, representative agent model to evaluate the
impact of differences in average tax rates. We extend this argument, and use a life-
cycle model with heterogeneous agents, who accumulate labor market experience,
and reside in one- and two person households. This allows us to capture several
dimensions of tax systems that cannot be captured in a representative agent model.
We fit nonlinear income tax schedules that can capture the impact of both tax levels
and tax progressivity on aggregate labor supply, as well as one the labor supply of
various demographic groups. We are also able to capture the impact of joint versus
separate taxation of married couples. As pointed out by Guner, Kaygusuz & Ventura
(2008), separate taxation of married couples leads to a lower marginal tax rate on
the secondary earner in a couple, and therefore encourages female labor supply. In
Section 3.7, we find this to be an important effect in our model.
To the best of our knowledge, the role of differences in marriage stability in ac-
counting for cross-country differences in labor supply has not been analyzed in the
literature. Yet, our finding in Section II below that the biggest contribution to the
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cross-cross country differences in average hours worked comes from women, and in
particular from prime-aged married women, suggests that one may need to pay at-
tention to the cross-country differences in family dynamics. There is ample anecdotal
evidence that compared to the US, marriages are more stable in Europe, especially
in “catholic” European countries such as Italy, Spain, Ireland, and Greece where di-
vorces have traditionally carried more social stigma with them. Our hypothesis is
that more stable marriages provide implicit income and consumption insurance to
the spouse who is not the main income earner in the family (the role that for vari-
ous reasons is traditionally played by the wife), thus giving her/him less incentive to
accumulate market experience.
One may argue that divorce and marriage decisions are also affected by economic
conditions and that therefore we should make them endogenous choices. However,
then we would need a systematic cross-country pattern in economic conditions that
could account for both the pattern in divorce rates and in labor supply at the same
time. This type of condition could be for instance cross-country differences in the
gender wage gap, in the female return to labor market experience, or in the cost of
having children. These explanations have been proposed in the literature trying to
explain changes in female labor supply over time, see for instance Olivetti (2006)
and Attanasio, Low & Sanchez-Marcos (2008). However, we have not been able to
document a cross-country pattern in the gender wage gap or in the female return to
labor market experience that would help us explain the observed patterns in aggregate
labor supply and divorce rates. In Section 3.2, we argue that children are unlikely
to be an important explanation, as the cross country differences in labor supply is
not more pronounced for women with children. We therefore choose to study the
economic implications of exogenous differences in marriage and divorce rates caused
by ”cultural” and/or legal factors. Crouch & Beaulieu (2006) documents a correlation
56
between different types of divorce laws and divorce rates in the US and 22 European
countries. Generally divorce laws are stricter in Europe. For instance, they require
a longer waiting period before a divorce can be obtained. Johnson & Skinner (1986)
provides empirical support to our theory about the impact of exogenous changes in
the probability of divorces on female labor supply. They estimate a simultaneous
model of future divorce probability and current labor supply using US data, and
conclude that their results support the hypothesis that higher divorce probabilities
increase labor supply, while the reverse effect appears insignificant. Stevenson (n.d.)
documents that the US states who adopted unilateral divorce in the 1970s experienced
a spike in female labor supply compared to states who did not.
One pronounced difference between the US labor market and those in many Eu-
ropean countries is the more rigid regulations and laws in Europe, often referred to in
the literature as labor market frictions. These are possible contributors to the higher
observed unemployment rates and lower labor force participation rates in Europe.
Unions are also much more common in Europe. Alesina, Glaeser & Sacerdote (2005)
argues that regulations and unionization are more like explanations than taxes. We
believe that they could also be contributing factors and that we should not hope for
taxes and divorce rates to explain all of the cross country variation in labor supply.
Out of all the above proposed explanations, however, differences in divorce rates stand
out as a promising candidate for explaining why cross country differences is mainly
driven by female labor supply.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, we study the
contributions of different demographic groups to aggregate differences in labor supply
between the US and 8 European countries. In section 3.3, we document a correla-
tion between aggregate labor supply and taxation across countries and a correlation
between aggregate labor supply and divorce rates across time and place. Section 3.4
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studies the impact of divorce rates on labor supply in a simple model. Section 3.5 de-
velops the quantitative model. Section 2.5 discusses data and calibration. In Section
3.7, we study the quantitative implications from changing the US divorce and mar-
riage probabilities to their European counterparts and from introducing European
tax schemes in the US. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Which Demographics Groups Contribute to
Differences in Aggregate Labor Supply: US
vs. Europe
In this section, we use data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the OECD
Employment Database to analyze the contribution of various demographic groups to
cross-country differences in aggregate labor supply. We find that women is the biggest
contributor to the cross-country differences in labor supply. American women work
more than European women, whether it is single women, married women, women with
and without children. The contribution of women is the largest in Spain, Italy, Greece
and Ireland – the countries where, as we document in the next section, marriages tend
to be more stable.
Next, we analyze the importance of the intensive and extensive margins in ac-
counting for the cross-country differences in labor supply, and find that they are both
important. However, the extensive margin is particularly important for Spain, Italy,
Greece and Ireland (coincidentally, these are the countries where the contribution of
women is also particularly large), while the intensive margin is particularly important
in Germany and Netherlands.
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Data Description
The LIS database that we use contains micro-level data from the United States and a
large number of European countries. The advantage of using this database is that the
LIS team harmonizes and standardizes the micro data from the different countries’
surveys in order to facilitate comparative research.
The LIS database provides information about individual hours worked per week
and weeks worked per year1. We construct annual hours worked as the product of
these two variables. To make our data comparable to the OECD aggregate-level
estimates used by Rogerson (2006) and Prescott (2004), we include in our sample
all individuals between 15 and 64 years of age. We make two adjustments to the
LIS data. First, for several European countries the LIS database does not provide
information about the labor market outcomes for 15 and/or 16 year-olds2. In these
instances, we replace the missing values with the appropriate group averages from
the US sample.
Table 3.1 reports the average annual hours worked by individuals who are from
15 to 64 years old in the US and a number of European countries, computed using
the LIS data for year 2000. For comparison, the last two columns of the table also
show the corresponding averages computed using the OECD data.
Unfortunately, for several European countries the average annual hours worked
computed from the LIS data differ substantially from those reported by the OECD.
Further research is needed to understand what causes this discrepancy. One possible
explanation is that the LIS data does not capture the differences between the countries
in the number of holidays and paid vacations3.
1Variables phoursu and pweektl.
2For instance, German data does not have labor market information for both 15 and 16 year-olds,
while for Spain and Ireland, this information is missing only for 15 year-olds
3A vast majority of individuals in all countries in the LIS data report either 0 or 52 weeks
worked per year. At the same time, Jorgensen (2002) documents that individuals in most European
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Table 3.1: Annual hours worked, all persons 15-64 years of age, 2000
Country Annual Hours, % of the US, Number Annual Hours, % of the US,
LIS LIS of obs, LIS OECD OECD
US 1375.46 100.0 84286 1360.69 100.0
Germany 1273.10 92.6 19845 965.91 70.99
Italy 1104.15 80.3 15354 1002.85 73.70
Spain 1127.14 81.9 9560 993.40 73.01
Ireland 1219.18 88.6 5992 1117.82 82.15
Austria 1375.30 100.0 4580 1132.39 83.22
Belgium 1344.42 97.7 4488 941.14 69.17
Netherlands 1240.23 90.2 8346 1117.82 72.76
Greece 1238.89 90.1 7309 1184.56 87.06
Since most of the previous research on the cross-country differences in labor supply
has relied on the OECD data, we use the OECD data to determine the average
country-level annual hours worked, and use the LIS data mainly to compute the
contributions of various demographic groups to the cross-country differences. To
account for the discrepancy between the OECD and LIS data, we uniformly scale all
individual observations in each country in the LIS data so that the aggregate country-
level averages that we obtain from the LIS data are equal to those reported by the
OECD. Such adjustment makes the contributions of various demographic groups to
the cross-country differences in aggregate-level average hours worked more uniform
(in other words, we obtain a conservative estimate of the contribution of women to
the cross-country differences, since this adjustment makes the contribution of separate
demographic groups less pronounced)4.
Table 3.2 shows the average annual hours worked for men and women separately,
computed using the LIS 2000 data (adjusted as explained above). The table shows
that the difference between the hours worked by European women and American
countries on average enjoy several more weeks of holidays compared to Americans.
4Our current adjustment is appropriate, for example, if the duration of vocations and holidays
for each individual is a certain percent of his/her workdays. If, on the other hand, one assumes
that the duration of vocations is the same for each individual, the differences in the contribution of
various demographic groups would become more emphasized.
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Table 3.2: Annual Hours Worked, Men and Women, 15-64 yrs. old, LIS 2000
Country
Men Women
Annual Hours % of US Annual Hours % of US
US 1596.82 100.0 1164.64 100.0
Germany 1225.33 76.7 716.87 61.6
Italy 1351.31 84.6 658.78 56.6
Spain 1355.47 84.9 633.17 54.4
Ireland 1517.71 95.0 718.02 61.7
Austria 1425.27 89.3 844.41 72.5
Belgium 1192.77 74.7 711.24 61.1
Netherlands 1319.30 82.6 675.91 58.0
Greece 1671.21 104.7 738.49 63.4
women is larger than the corresponding difference for men, both in percentage and in
absolute terms. This difference between genders is more pronounced in Italy, Spain,
Ireland and Greece, and less pronounced in Germany, Belgium and Austria.
Table 3.14 in the appendix shows the average annual hours worked of individuals
in 3 different age groups: 1) “young” (15-20 year-olds), 2) “prime-aged” (21-55 year-
olds) and 3) “old” (56-64 year-olds). There is substantial heterogeneity in hours
worked by the “young” across the countries in our data (part of this could reflect
poorer quality of the data for this age group). The hours worked by the “prime-
aged” and “old” individuals in Europe are uniformly lower compared to the US.
Figure 3.1 plots the age profiles, using more detailed data (5-year age groups),
separately for men and women for the US and European countries. This figure illus-
trates that there is a larger difference in hours worked between the US and Europe
for women than for men. It also suggests that while the age profiles for men appear
to have similar shapre in the US and Europe (with hours worked peaking in the mid-
dle age group, 35-44 year-olds), in most European countries (with the exception of
Germany and Austria) the age profiles for women look markedly different, with hours
worked peaking earlier than in the US.
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Figure 3.1: Average hours worked by gender and age group
Averages are adjusted so that the total average across all subgroups is equal to the one
reported by the OECD.
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Table 3.3 compares the average annual hours worked by marital status and gender.
It shows that in percentage terms married women in Europe display a bigger difference
(work less) relative to their American counterparts than do single women. For men,
the pattern is much less clear.
Given that we find that the difference in hours worked between the US and Europe
is larger for women than for men, it is natural to ask whether this is related to women
reducing their labor supply as a result of having children. Figure 3.12 in the appendix
shows that in most of the countries where women worked the least compared to the
US (Italy, Spain and Greece, but not in Ireland), women in fact tended to have fewer
children than in the US.
Table 3.16 shows the hours worked by men and women split into three groups:
1) “child 3”, which includes the individuals who have a child under 3 years of age,
2) “child 6”, which includes the individuals who have a child under 6 years of age,
3) “no child”, which includes individuals with no small children. According to the
table, it is only in Germany and Austria that mothers with small children reduce
their labor supply further compared to the US. In the countries where women worked
the least (Italy, Spain, Greece and Ireland), the percentage difference with the US
in hours worked for mothers with small children is smaller than for women without
small children.
These two observations: 1) that fertility in the US is relatively high; 2) women
with small children in Europe do not reduce their labor supply relative to their Amer-
ican counterparts, suggest that having small children is not a major reason for the
difference in women’s labor supply between the US and Europe.
Group Contribution Decomposition
To analyze the contribution of various demographic groups to the difference between
aggregate labor supply in the US and the European countries in our sample, we
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Table 3.3: Annual hours worked, by Gender and Marital Status, LIS 2000
Country
Men Women
Married Single Married Single
Annual % of US Annual % of US Annual % of US Annual % of US
Hours Hours Hours Hours
US 1965.87 100.0 1183.67 100.0 1207.27 100.0 1114.78 100.0
Germany 1398.72 71.2 1022.14 86.4 631.36 52.3 826.44 74.1
Italy 1620.99 82.5 982.29 83.0 651.98 54.0 669.62 60.1
Spain 1675.59 85.2 945.39 79.9 616.55 51.1 656.87 58.9
Ireland 1916.06 97.5 1107.74 93.6 692.64 57.4 747.04 67.0
Austria 1508.93 76.8 1324.17 111.9 807.33 66.9 891.72 80.0
Belgium 1328.43 67.6 971.42 82.1 713.24 59.1 708.17 63.5
Netherlands 1461.07 74.3 1134.34 95.8 553.21 45.8 856.81 76.9
Greece 1896.69 96.5 1276.75 107.9 748.15 62.0 719.60 64.6
perform the following decomposition. Suppose we divide each country’s sample into
n different groups. Then the difference between the aggregate average annual hours
worked in the US, Hus, and in country j, Hj, can be written as:
Hus −Hj =
n∑
i=1
ωusi h
us
i −
n∑
i=1
ωjih
j
i
=
n∑
i=1
(husi − h
j
i )ω
us
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
behavioral effect
+
n∑
i=1
(ωusi − ω
j
i )h
j
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
composition effect
where ωji is the share of observations that come from group i in country j’s sample,
while hji is the average annual hours worked by individuals in this group.
We divide the data into 12 demographic groups, according to gender, marital sta-
tus and age (using 3 age groups). We are interested in analyzing the first summand
in the expression above, which we call the behavioral effect, after removing the sam-
ple composition effect (which amounts to looking at a hypothetical case where the
composition of the samples in different countries would be identical). Tables 3.20 and
3.21 in the appendix show the sample compositions in all our countries. It is worth
noting that the total contribution of the compositional effects is quite small – in most
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cases, it is smaller than 5% of the total difference in average hours, except for Belgium
(-8.717%), Greece (-7.176%) and Netherlands (-6.174%). Tables 3.17 and 3.18 show
the contribution of different demographic groups to the aggregate difference in hours
worked, weighted by the size of the appropriate group in the US sample,
husi −h
j
i
Hus−Hj
ωusi .
These tables show that women in general contribute more to the differences in
labor supply than men. We find that in all countries, the contribution of women
is larger than 50%. This difference between the contribution of the two genders is
especially large in the four “catholic” countries – Spain, Italy, Ireland and Greece,
where it ranges from 66% in Italy to 101% in Greece. In all countries except Belgium,
married prime-aged women are the biggest contributing group. In Spain, Italy, Ireland
and Greece single prime-aged women are the second-largest contributing group.
Intensive vs Extensive Margin
Table 3.2 shows the contribution of intensive and extensive margins to the overall
cross-country differences in labor supply, using the following decomposition formula:
HUS −H i = HUSempl · Share
US
empl −H
i
empl · Share
i
empl
=
(
HUSempl −H
i
empl
)
ShareUSempl︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intensive Margin
+
(
ShareUSempl − Share
i
empl
)
H iempl︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extensive Margin
From the OECD data, one can compute the total average hours worked in country
i, H i, as the product of the hours worked by employed persons, H iempl, and the share
of the population which is employed, Shareiempl. Table 3.2 reports the contributions
of intensive and extensive margins as a percentage of the total difference in hours
worked between the US and country i, HUS − H i. As can be seen from the table,
both margins appear to be important. The contribution of the extensive margin is
particularly large in Greece, Italy, Spain and Ireland. The intensive margin is more
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important in the Netherlands and Germany.
Table 3.4: Contribution of Intensive and Extensive Margins to Cross-Country Differ-
ences in Labor Supply
Country Intensive Margin, % Extensive Margin, %
Germany 68.21 31.79
Italy -5.16 105.16
Spain 21.34 78.66
Ireland 35.82 64.18
Austria 57.87 42.13
Belgium 51.46 48.54
Netherlands 92.44 7.56
Greece -119.62 219.62
3.3 Possible Determinants of Labor Supply: Taxes
and Marriage Stability
In this section, we analyze the empirical relationship between hours worked in the
US and Europe, and the following two candidate explanations for cross-country dif-
ferences in labor supply: 1) differences in taxes; 2) differences in marriage stability.
Taxes have been suggested as a major contributor to cross country differences in
labor supply in the literature (see Prescott (2004) and Rogerson (2006)). Marriage
stability is a new explanation in this context, motivated by our finding in section 3.2
that women are the biggest contributor to the cross-country differences in labor sup-
ply. Our hypothesis is that more stable marriages provide consumption insurance,
thereby reducing the incentives to accumulate labor market experience, in particu-
larly for women (who usually are secondary earners). Conversely, a higher probability
of divorce can increase the value of market experience for the woman who has a higher
probability of ending up as a single earner.
We first compare and discuss some features of the tax systems in the US and
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Europe with particular focus on the 9 countries in Table 1: the US, Germany, Italy,
Spain, Ireland, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece. We then study the
correlation between labor supply and various measures of tax levels, tax progressiv-
ity, and marriage stability in a larger sample of countries. We find that there is
positive correlation between taxes and aggregate labor supply, and negative correla-
tion between marriage stability and aggregate labor supply, but in both cases, the
correlation is not very strong. In addition, when we regress average annual hours
worked in each country on different measures of taxation and marriage stability sep-
arately, the regression coefficients have the expected sign, but are only marginally
statistically significant (at 10% significance level), and the R2 of the regressions are
very low. However, when we combine a measure of tax levels and divorce rates in
the same regression, both regression coefficients become highly statistically signifi-
cant, and the adjusted R2 increases considerably (to 49.4%). We conjecture that
the importance of these two mechanisms is different for different groups of countries
within Europe. Finally, we document strong correlation between female employment
rates and divorce rates5. These observations motivate us to more carefully study the
impact of taxes and marriage stability on labor supply in a structural model.
Labor Income Taxes in the US and Europe
There are many issues to consider when comparing labor income taxes across coun-
tries. (i) Firstly, both the levels and progressivity of taxes may be of interest, when
studying the impact of taxation on labor supply. (ii) Secondly, taxes differ with re-
spect to marital status. In the US, Germany, Spain, and Ireland married couples
are taxed jointly, while in Italy, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece they
are taxed separately. In the whole OECD there are 19 countries practicing separate
5Unfortunately, we are restricted to using the employment rates when we look at the labor supply
by gender, since the OECD does not provide information for hours worked separately for men and
women.
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Figure 3.2: Country Labor Income Tax Functions (singles)
taxation of married couples and 11 countries practicing joint taxation. There may
also be slightly different schemes for married households with 1 and 2 earners. (iii)
Finally, taxes vary with the number of children in the household. In this section, we
will focus on the taxes paid by single households without children6.
For each country in Table 3.19, we fit a polynomial tax function, based on tax
data from the OECD7: Among our countries, labor income taxes are the lowest in
Spain and Greece, moderate to low in the US, and highest in Germany and Belgium.
In figure 3.2 we plot fitted labor income tax schedules for single individuals in Spain,
the US, and Germany.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.19 display the top marginal tax rates and the income
level where they become effective for single households in the US and many Western
6Essentially, we abstract in this section from points (ii) and (iii) above. We do it here because
taxes paid by an average single household without children is the measure that is most easily com-
parable between the countries. In sections 3.5-3.7, we differentiate between the taxes paid by single
and married households within the structural model of labor supply.
7See Appendix
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European countries. There are not always large differences in the maximum tax rates
but the income level where they become effective also vary greatly. In Germany, for
instance, the top tax rate becomes effective already at 1.5 times average earnings,
while in the US the top marginal rate first becomes effective at 9 times average
earnings. Column 4 of Table 1 displays the labor income tax paid by singles with
average earnings across countries.
A person making labor supply decisions will care about his marginal tax rate in
addition to his tax level. It is possible that tax progressivity, and not only the level
of taxes are important for the cross country pattern in labor supply. A commonly
used measure for tax progressivity is so-called progressivity wedges, see for instance
Guvenen, Kuruscu & Ozkan (2009):
PW (y1, y2) = 1−
1− τ(y2)
1− τ(y1)
This measure says something about how fast the tax rate increases as earnings
increase from y1 to y2. If there is a flat tax, then the progressivity wedge would be
zero for all levels of y1 and y2. Figure 3.3 plots progressivity wedges for y1 = 0.5AE
for the US, Germany, Spain, Denmark, and Switzerland. Among the 17 countries
in Table 3.19, Denmark has the most progressive taxes and Switzerland the least
progressive. The US is among the countries with the least progressive taxes, while
Germany are among the countries with the most progressive taxes.
Consumption Taxes
Consumption taxes also have an impact on labor supply decisions. The second column
of Table 2 reports these flat taxes in (2001). The consumption tax varies from 7.6% in
Switzerland on the low end to 25% in Denmark and Sweden on the high end. Among
our 9 countries, the US stands out with low consumption taxes.
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Figure 3.3: Country Tax Functions (Singles)
Correlation between Labor Supply and Taxes and Labor Supply and Divorce Rates
In Figure 3.4, we plot the correlation between labor supply and four tax-related
measures. They are: the average labor income tax rate at average earnings, the
average effective tax rate on labor income at average earnings, the top marginal tax
rate, and the tax progressivity wedge at y1 = 0.5AE, y2 = 2AE. The effective tax
rate on labor income, τ , as defined in Prescott (2004) is:
τ = 1−
1− τl
1 + τc
It is the fraction of labor income that is taken in the form of taxes, holding
investment fixed. In other words a measure that combines labor income tax and
consumption tax into a single tax rate.
As can be seen from Figure 3.4, there is generally a negative but weak correlation
between different measures of taxes and aggregate hours worked. The strongest cor-
relation, −0.45, is with the effective tax rate at average earnings. There is a negative
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Figure 3.4: Relationship between annual hours and tax measures by country
relationship between labor supply and all our tax measures, but only the regression
coefficient for the effective tax rate at average earnings is marginally statistically
significant at the 10% level. In addition, the largest adjusted R2 in the regressions
is 15%, so taxes alone do not explain much of the cross- country variation in labor
supply.
In figure 3.5, we plot the correlation between divorce rates and aggregate labor
supply. The data for divorce rates in European countries is constructed using Eurostat
data, while for the US we use the National Vital Statistics data provided by the
Centers for Decease Control and Prevention, and the US Census data. As can be
seen from Figure 3.5, there is a positive relationship between average annual hours
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worked and divorce rates. The regression coefficient is almost statistically significant
at the 5% level, and the adjusted R2 is only 13.7%.
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Figure 3.5: Relationship between annual hours and divorce rate by country
In Table 3.5 we present the results from a regression of labor supply on divorce
rate and each of the different tax measures. In two cases (when using the average
labor income tax and average effective tax rate), the coefficients for both the divorce
rates and the tax measure that we use are statistically significant at any conventional
significance level, and the adjusted R2 improves substantially to 49.4%. Using both
taxes and divorce rates together explains a significant share of the cross- country
variation in labor supply.
Guner et al. (2008) argue that one of the features of the tax system that can
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Table 3.5: Regressing Average Hours Worked on Divorce rate and Tax Measures
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Const 1321.283∗∗∗ 1166.408∗∗∗ 1258.655∗∗∗ 1383.385∗∗∗
(207.819) (137.197) (83.996) (112.1656)
Divorce rate 27.101∗ 19.428 42.036∗∗∗ 36.733∗∗∗
(13.694) (13.418) (11.627) (10.968)
Top marginal tax rate −6.409 – – –
(4.215)
Progressivity wedge – −629.513 – –
(515.734)
Average labor income tax – – −1156.867∗∗∗ –
(316.286)
Average effective tax rate – – – −1088.327∗∗∗
(297.347)
adjusted R2 0.151 0.106 0.494 0.494
Standard errors are in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
be particularly important for the labor supply of the married couples is whether the
labor income of the couple is taxed jointly or separately. Table 3.25 in the appendix
reports the regression results when we add a dummy variable equal to 1 for countries
in our sample that practice separate taxation. Table 3.25 shows that the coefficient
for separate taxation in 3 out of 4 regressions reported in the table has the expected
positive sign, but is not statistically significant.
Unfortunately, the OECD dataset does not provide data for hours worked sepa-
rately for men and women, but it does provide data on employment rates by gender.
Figure 3.6 shows the relationship between the divorce rates and employment ratios by
country for men and women separately. It shows that for both men and women, this
relationship is positive, but the magnitude of the coefficient is about three times as
large for women as it is for men. In addition, the coefficient is statistically significant
for women and not statistically significant for men.
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 in the appendix show the relationship between our tax
measures and employment ratios for women and men respectively. None of the tax
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Figure 3.6: Relationship between divorce rates and employment ratios for men and
women by country
measures is statistically significant for either of the sexes, and in many cases the
relationship appears to be negative. We conclude that our macro level data suggest
that while both tax measures and divorce rates appear to be related to annual hours
worked, taxes appear to impact mostly the intensive margin (hours worked for those
who are employed), while divorce rates appear to be related to the extensive margin –
the employment ratios (see figure 3.15), and this relationship appears much stronger
for women.
Finally, Table 3.6 shows the panel regression results, when regressing employment
ratios on divorce rates for men and women separately, using the data from 1990 to
2009 (one obtains a qualitatively similar results when starting at an earlier date)8.
8Since the Eurostat data on the number of divorces that we use to construct the divorce rate
measure spans different time periods for different countries, we have an unbalanced panel. The US
data start in 2000. Also, the data here lacks observations for some European countries, such as
Spain and Greece, altogether. In our previous cross-sectional plots for 2001, we used the Eurostat
Census 2001 data on the number of married people for these countries, but this data is available
only for one year, 2001.
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The panel regression results provide further support to our finding that divorce rates
appear to affect mostly the labor supply of women.
Table 3.6: Relationship between employment ratios and divorce rates, panel regression
results
Employment rate Women Men
Constant 51.809∗∗∗ 72.681∗∗∗
(2.795) ( 2.076)
Divorce rates 1.685∗∗∗ 0.323
(0.398) (0.283)
Standard errors are in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In this section, we have documented an empirical relationship between aggregate
labor supply and taxes and aggregate labor supply and divorce rates. This motivates
our study in the next three sections of the impact of taxes, divorce- and marriage
probabilities on labor supply in a structural model.
3.4 Gaining Intuition: Labor Supply and Divorce
in a Simple Two-Period Model
In this section, we outline the intuition for the effect of divorce rates on women’s
labor supply using a simplified two-period version of our model9. We describe our
full model in the next section.
Consider a family that consists of a husband (a “man”) and a wife (a “woman”)
who live for 2 periods. Suppose that both members of the family have 1 unit of time
at their disposal in each period. For simplicity, assume here that the husband always
works full-time, while the wife has to decide how much time to spend working in
period 1 and in period 2. Assume that the husband’s wage in period 1 is w1,m, while
9The intuition concerning the effect of taxation is described very well in Rogerson (2007), Guner
et al. (2008) etc.
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the wife’s wage in the first period is w1,f . Suppose that their wages in the second
period increase linearly with the amount of time they spend working in period 1,
with parameters km and kf controlling the “returns to experience” for the husband
and the wife. Thus, the husband’s wage in period 2 is w1,m + km (since the husband
always works full-time), while the wife’s wage in period 2 is w1,f + kfh1,f . Assume
that with probability πd, the couple divorces before the second period starts. Suppose
that they cannot save or borrow in period 1.
At the start of period 1, the couple jointly solves:
max
c1,c2,cs2,m,c
s
2,f ,
h1,f ,h2,f ,h
s
2,f
α log(c1/e) + (1− α) log(1− h1,f) + (1− πd)(α log(c2/e)
+ (1− α) log(1− h2,f )) + πd
(
log(cs2,m) + α log(c
s
2,f) + (1− α) log(1− h
s
2,f)
)
s.t.: c1 = w1,m + w1,fh1,f ,
c2 = w1,m + km + (w1,f + kfh1,f)h2,f ,
cs2,m = w1,m + km,
cs2,f = (w1,f + kfh1,f)h
s
2,f .
where h2,f is the woman’s choice of work in period 2 in case she stays married, h
s
2,f
is her choice of work if she gets divorced, and e is the adult equivalence scale.
The solution is characterized by the following 3 first-order conditions:
1− α
1− h2,f
=
α
c2
(w1,f + kfh1,f), (3.1)
1− α
1− hs2,f
=
α
cs2,f
(w1,f + kfh1,f ), (3.2)
1− α
1− h1,f
=
α
cs1,f
w1,f + (1− πd)
α
c2
kfh2,f + πd
α
cs2,f
kfh
s
2,f . (3.3)
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First, let us consider how a change in the probability of divorce, πd, affects the
woman’s choice of labor supply in period 1, h1,f . An increase in πd will affect h1,f
both directly through equation 3.3, and also indirectly through the effect of the change
in h1,f on h2,f and h
s
2,f in equations 3.1 and 3.2, which feeds back into c2 and c
s
2,f in
equation 3.3. For simplicity, let us disregard the indirect effect, and concentrate on
the direct effect in equation 3.3. On the right hand side of that equation, we have the
marginal benefit of an increase in the wife’s work in period 1, which includes both an
immediate increase in consumption in period 1, and the increase in consumption in
period 2 because of the accumulation of the woman’s experience (and increased period
2 wages). An increase in πd effectively decreases the weight put on the second period’s
marginal utility of consumption in case the couple stays married, and increases the
weight on the second period’s marginal utility of consumption of the divorced woman.
Intuitively, because the income of the married couple also includes the income of the
husband (which typically is larger than the income of the wife), we get c2 > c
s
2,f .
From equations 3.1 and 3.2, it also follows that hs2,f > h2,f , so that
α
cs2,f
hs2,f >
α
c2,f
h2,f ,
and such re-weighting increases the marginal benefit from the woman’s work in period
1. This increases the woman’s incentive to work in period 1.
Given the utility function that we have assumed in this section, one can in fact
show that10
Proposition 3.4.1. The increase in divorce probability increases woman’s labor sup-
ply in period 1:
∂h1,f
∂πd
> 0.
It is clear from equation 3.3 that for the change in divorce probability to have an
impact on the woman’s labor supply, we need kf > 0 (returns to experience must be
10See Appendix for the proof.
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positive). One can expect this impact to be larger, the bigger is the gender wage gap
(wm
wf
). One could also be tempted to conclude from equation 3.3 that the effect of
the change in divorce probability is stronger, the bigger is the returns to experience.
However, even though this is true for fixed c2 and c
s
f,f , and we found it to be true
for a variety of reasonable choices of parameters in this simple two-period model, this
could be at least partially offset by the income effect of the increase in kf , which
could be larger for the single woman.
An increase in woman’s labor supply in period 1 leads to accumulation of experi-
ence, and thus higher wages in period 2. On one hand, this gives both the married
and the single woman an incentive to increase labor supply in period 2 through the
substitution effect. However, there is also potentially an offsetting income effect. In-
tuitively, the income effect will be stronger for the divorced woman who does not have
access to her spouse’s income (and thus, its is more likely that the married woman will
increase her labor supply in period 2). Given the utility function we have assumed
in this section, we get hs2,f = α and h2,f =
α(w1,f+kfh1,f+w1,m+km)−(w1,m+km)
w1,f+kfh1,f
, so that
∂hs2,f
∂pid
= 0 and
∂h2,f
∂pid
=
∂h2,f
∂h1,f
∂h1,f
∂pid
=
kf (w1,m+km)(1−α)
(w1,f+kfh1,f )2
∂h1,f
∂pid
> 0
To see that the increased probability of divorce can also increase labor supply of
single women, imagine that there are 3 periods of active life, all women are single in
period 0, but they are certain to get married in period 1 (and periods 1 and 2 are the
same as the above), and that the the wages the woman receives in period 2 increase
both in experience accumulated in period 0 and 1.
3.5 Quantitative Model
The stationary economy is populated by three types of households: single males, single
females, and married couples. Individuals start their life at age 20. They live for at
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least 65 years, and at most 95 years, but enter retirement at age 65. A model period
is 1 year, so there are a total of 45 model periods of active work life. Single households
face an age-dependent probability of becoming married, while married couples face
an age dependent probability of divorce. One is more likely to be married to someone
with the same level of education. We assume that marriage will always happen to a
partner of the same age, and that married couples die together. Households decide
whether to participate in the labor market, how much to consume, and how much to
save, and they accumulate labor market experience.
Labor Income. The wage, w, of an individual depends on his level of education,
j ∈ {hs, c} (where “hs” stands for high school and “c” stands for college), gender,
g ∈ {m, f}, and years of labor market experience, x:
w(j, g, x) = eγ0jg+γ1jgx+γ2jgx
2+γ3jgx
3
(3.4)
Given this wage function, the beginning wage levels as well as the returns to experience
are allowed to differ by level of education and gender.
Preferences. The momentary utility function of single individuals, US , depends on
labor market participation, n ∈ 0, 1, consumption, c, and on gender:
USg (c, n) =
c1−σ
1− σ
− Fgn (3.5)
Fg is here a fixed, gender specific, disutility from working. Married couples have a
joint utility function, UM , with shared consumption, measured in adult equivalents:
UM (c, nm, nf ) =
(
c
e
)1−σ
1− σ
− Fmnm − Ffnf (3.6)
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Household’s Problem
Written recursively, a single household’s problem can be formalized as follows:
V Sg,j(k, x, t) = max
c,n,k′
USg (c, n) + β
(
(1− πm(t))V
S
g,j(k
′, x′, t+ 1)
+ πm(t)Ejp,k′p,x′p
[
V Mj,jp(k
′ + k′p, x
′, x′p, t+ 1)
])
s.t.: c(1 + τc) + k
′ = k(1 + r) + nw(j, g, x)(1− τn,S(w(j, g, x)n)) + (1− n)T,
x′ = x+ n, n ∈ {0, 1}, k′ ≥ 0, c > 0 (3.7)
k here is the level of asset holdings, r is the risk-free interest rate, and β the time
discount factor. τc is a constant consumption tax, while τn is a nonlinear labor income
tax. In the US and some European countries, the tax schedule is dependent on
whether a person is single or married. T is an individual’s income if he chooses not to
participate in the labor market. The sources of such income would be unemployment
benefits, social aid, transfers from relatives and charities and so on. πm(t) is a age-
dependent probability of becoming married in the next period. The subscript, p,
stands for partner. In the case that an individual becomes married in the next period,
the expectation of next period’s utility must be taken with respect to the distribution
over potential partners’ education, experience, and asset holdings, Qjgt(jp, x
′
p, k
′
p).
An individual is more likely to find a partner of his own education group, and the
distribution of partners naturally varies by gender and age. The distribution over x′p
and k′p is derived from the individuals’ optimal desicions.
Married couples maximize their joint utility and face a time-dependent probability,
πd(t), of becoming divorced. When couples divorce, they split their assets evenly.
80
Their problem can be written as:
V Mjm,jf (k, xm, xf , t) = maxc,k′,nm,nf
UM (c, nm, nf)
+ β
(
(1− πd(t))V
M
jm,jf
(k′, x′m, x
′
f , t+ 1)
+ πd(t)
(
V Sm,jm(k
′/2, x′m, t+ 1) + V
S
f,jf
(k′/2, x′f , t+ 1)
))
s.t: c(1 + τc) + k
′ = k(1 + r) + (nmwm + nfwf)(1− τn,M(nmwm + nfwf))
+(2− (nm + nf ))T
x′m = xm + nm, x
′
f = xf + nf , nf , nm ∈ {0, 1}, k
′ ≥ 0, c > 0 (3.8)
Retired households make no labor supply decisions but receive an amount of social
security, Φ(g), depending on their gender. We assume that retired households do
not marry or get divorced, and that husband and wife die at the same time. Their
problem, if single, is simply:
V Sg (k, t) = max
c>0,k′≥0
USg (c) + Ω(t)βV
S
g (k
′, t+ 1)
s.t.: c(1 + τc) + k
′ = k(1 + r) + Φ(g), (3.9)
where Ω(t) is the probability of survival until the next period. Married retirees solve:
V M(k, t) = max
c>0,k′≥0
UM(c) + Ω(t)βV M(k′, t + 1),
s.t.: c(1 + τc) + k
′ = k(1 + r) + Φ(m) + Φ(f), (3.10)
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3.6 Calibration
This section describes the calibration of the model parameters. We calibrate our
model to match the appropriate moments from the US data. We use data from
different sources. We try to use data from 2000 or the year closest to 2000 that
we can obtain. Many parameters can be calibrated to direct empirical counterparts
without solving the model. They are listed in Table3.7. The 7 parameters in Table
2 below are, however, calibrated using an exactly identified simulated method of
moments approach. We use the data from the European countries in our sample
only to obtain the estimates of tax polynomials and age-specific marriage and divorce
probabilities, which we use in section 3.7 in our counterfactual experiments.
Preferences
The momentary utility function is a standard CRRA utility function in equations
3.5 and , with consumption measured in adult equivalents, c
e
. We use the OECD
adult equivalence scale and set e = 1.7 for married couples, and e = 1.0 for singles.
Consistent with a survey of the empirical literature in Browning et. al. (1999), we
set the coefficient of relative risk aversion, σ, equal to 2. The discount factor, β,
and fixed costs of working, Fm and Ff , are among the estimated parameters. The
corresponding data moments are the mean asset holdings of households with head
aged 20 − 64, taken from the PSID (99-05), and the male- and female employment
rates, taken from OECD 2000.
Risk Free Interest Rate
Given the partial equilibrium nature of the model, we take the risk free rate as fixed
and calibrate it using the data. We set the risk free rate equal to the average of
3-month t-bill rates minus inflation over the period from 1947-2008 based on data
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from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis11.
Wages
We calibrate the experience profile of wages exogenously, using the PSID from 1968-
1997. After 1997 it is not possible to get years of actual labor market experience
from the PSID. We regress earnings on a 3rd order polynomial in years of labor
market experience and control for the year of birth. We estimate different returns to
experience for each gender / education group. To get levels of earnings that are in
line with the asset holdings, we include a parameter controlling the average earnings
of each gender / education group in the structural estimation. The corresponding
data moments are the average wage of each group in the PSID 99-05.
Taxes
The labor income tax schedule is a polynomial function of an individual’s earnings
relative to the average earnings, AE, equation 3.12 in the appendix. As described in
more detail in the appendix, we fit this polynomial to labor income tax data from
the OECD tax database (2001). This data is constructed by the OECD based on tax
laws from different countries. It is well suited for cross country comparisons, see also
see Guvenen et al. (2009). For those countries who practice joint taxation of married
couples, we fit a different tax schedule for married and single individuals. Coming
up with an accurate estimate of consumption taxes in the US is complicated by the
fact that there are local county-level taxes in addition to state taxes. Vertex Inc. (a
consulting company) estimated that the average consumption tax in the US was 8.4%
in 2002. We use that number. For simplicity, we abstract from capital taxes. we do
this because different types of capital is taxed differently, and this also differs across
countries. Households do for instance have about half of their wealth in their homes
11Series TB3MS and GDPDEF.
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Table 3.7: Parameters Calibrated Outside of the Model
Parameter Value Description Target
r 0.011 Risk free interest rate (annual) 3-mnth T-bill minus
inflation (1947-2008)
σ 2 u(c, n) = (c/e)
(1−σ)
(1−σ)
Browning et. al. (1999)
e 1.0 or 1.7 OECD equivalence scale.
γ1hsm, γ2hsm, γ3hsm 0.066, -20(-4), 17(-6) whsm = e
(γ0hsm+γ1hsmx+γ2hsmx
2+γ3hsmx
3) PSID (1968-1997)
γ1cm, γ2cm, γ3cm 0.109, -32(-4), 26(-6) wcm = e
(γ0cm+γ1cmx+γ2cmx2+γ3cmx3)
γ1hsf , γ2hsf , γ3hsf 0.069, -16(-4), 12(-6) whsf = e
(γ0hsf+γ1hsfx+γ2hsfx
2+γ3hsfx
3)
γ1cf , γ2cf , γ3cf 0.064, -12(-4), 6(-6) wcf = e
(γ0cf+γ1cfx+γ2cfx
2+γ3cfx
3)
τs0, τs1 1.727, -6.450 τ(y) = τs0 + τs1(y/AE)
0.2 OECD tax data (01)
τs2, τs3 8.995, -5.000 +τs2(y/AE)
0.4 + τs3(y/AE)
0.6
τs4 0.988 +τs4(y/AE)
0.8
τm0, τm1 2.162, -7.302 τ(y) = τm0 + τm1(y/AE)
0.2 OECD tax data (01)
τm2, τm3 9.222, -4.736 +τm2(y/AE)
0.4 + τm3(y/AE)
0.6
τm4 0.872 +τm4(y/AE)
0.8
τc 0.084 Consumption tax Vertex Inc. (2002)
T $8440 income if not working CEX 2000-2001
Φ(m),Φ(f) $12600, $9680 Social security S.S. Admin. (2000)
πm(t) Varies Prob. of marriage CPS (1999-2001)
πd(t) Varies Prob of divorce CPS (1999-2001)
Γ(t) Varies Death probabilities NCHS (1991-2001)
Fraction w. some college. 0.533 CPS (1999-2001)
Prob. intra ed. marriage 0.737 CPS (1999-2001)
k0 8260 Savings at age 20 NLSY97
M0 0.126 Share of married 20 year-olds CPS (1999-2001)
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Table 3.8: Parameters Calibrated Endogenously
Parameter Description Data Moment Value
γ0hsm whsm = e
(γ0hsm+γ1hsmx+γ2hsmx
2+γ3hsmx
3) Mean male hs-wages -1.438
γ0cm wcm = e
(γ0cm+γ1cmx+γ2cmx2+γ3cmx3) Mean male c-wages -1.464
γ0hsf whsf = e
(γ0hsf+γ1hsfx+γ2hsfx
2+γ3hsfx
3) Mean female hs-wages -2.081
γ0cf wcf = e
(γ0cf+γ1cfx+γ2cfx
2+γ3cfx
3) Mean female c-wages -1.692
β Discount factor Mean assets 1.001
Fm Fixed cost of working Male employment rate 2.092
Ff Fixed cost of working Female employment rate 2.265
which may or may not be taxed. In the US, interest income is taxed as labor income,
while dividends and capital gains are subject to capital gains tax. The return on
capital is, however, set very conservatively in our calibration. It is set equal to the
returns on risk free bonds, which was 1.1% over the past 60 years.
Death Probabilities and Social Security
The probability that a retiree will survive to the next period, we obtain from the
National Center for Health Statistics (1991-2001). We assume that all retirees receive
the same constant Social Security benefit, only dependent on gender. We obtain the
average benefit for males and females from the Annual Statistical Supplement to the
Social Security Bulletin (2000).
Marriage and Divorce Probabilities
To compute the age-specific probabilities for marriage and divorce for the US, we
use the data from the CPS March supplement from 1999-2001. For most European
countries, we use the data from Eurostat on-line database12. For some European
countries, we supplement it with the data from the IPUMS International.
We assume the stationary environment, where the probabilities of getting married
and divorced don’t change over time (we allow them to depend on the age of the
12Available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database.
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person, but not on his/her cohort)13. We also assume that the probability of getting
married is the same for those who get married for the first time, and those who
were previously divorced. This allows us to compute the probabilities using the
following approach. Let Mt and Dt be the share of the married and divorced persons
respectively at age t14. Then the probability of getting married at age t, πm(t), and
the probability of getting divorced at age t, πd(t), is pinned down by:
Mt+1 = (1−Mt)πm(t) +Mt(1− πd(t)),
Dt+1 = Dt(1− πm(t)) +Mtπd(t).
We smooth the resulting age-profiles for πm(t) and πd(t) by fitting a polynomial.
Figure 3.7 shows the resulting probability profiles for the US, Germany and Italy15.
Figure 3.7 shows that the probability of getting divorced is noticeably higher in
the US than Italy, and somewhat higher than in Germany. At the same time, the
probability of getting married reaches its peak in the US somewhat earlier compared
to the two European countries16.
Fixed Cost of Working and Income if Not Working
The data moments for the fixed cost of working for men and women are the male and
13Figure 3.16 in appendix shows the number of divorces per 1000 marriages for 3 countries – US,
Italy and Netherlands over a span of 10 (in case of US) to 20 (in case of Netherlands and Italy) years.
It shows that even though the number of divorces have been increasing in Italy and decreasing in
the US, these changes over time were rather slow and small compared to the differences in levels.
14Figure 3.18 in appendix shows the share of married women in the countries in our sample.
15Countries like Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal have marriage and divorce probabilities
similar to Italy, and countries like Netherlands and Belgium are similar in this respect to Germany.
16The computed probabilities use the data for women. We get a qualitatively similar picture when
using the data for both men and women (with the exception that men in all countries tend to get
married somewhat later than women).
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Figure 3.7: Age-dependent probabilities of marriage and divorce
female employment rates in 2000, taken from the OECD. As an approximation for in-
come when not working, we take the value of non-housing consumption of households
with income less than $5000 per year from the 2000-2001 Consumer Expenditure Sur-
vey. The sources of such income would be unemployment benefits, social aid, gifts
from relatives and charities etc.
Estimation Method
7 model parameters are calibrated using an exactly identified simulated method
of moments approach. We minimize the squared percentage deviation of simulated
model statistics from the 7 data moments in Table 3. Let Θ = {γ0hsm, γ0cm, γ0hsf , γ0cf ,
β, Fm, Ff} and let V (Θ) = (V1(Θ), . . . , V7(Θ))
′ denote the vector where Vi(Θ) =
(m¯−mˆ(Θ))/m is the percentage difference between empirical moments and simulated
moments. Then:
Vˆ = min
Θ
V (Θ)′V (Θ) (3.11)
Table3.8 summarizes the estimated parameter values. As can be seen from Table
3.9, we get close to match all the moments exactly.
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Table 3.9: Calibration Fit
Moment Data Model
Mean wage of high school educated males 0.396 0.396
Mean wage of college educated males 0.594 0.594
Mean wage of high school educated females 0.255 0.255
Mean wage of college educated females 0.372 0.372
Mean assets 1.200 1.198
Male employment rate 0.841 0.841
Female employment rate 0.699 0.700
3.7 Counterfactual Experiments
In Section 3.3, we have documented a correlation between labor supply and tax levels
and labor supply and divorce rates across countries and across time. This motivates
the study, in this section, of the quantitative impact of cross country differences in tax
schemes and divorce rates on labor supply. When we perform the policy experiments,
we keep taxes, old age social security, and income when not working as functions of
average earnings in the economy. In this way if the society becomes richer or poorer
because of a counterfactual experiment, taxes and social security payments will adjust
accordingly. Since there is no public good in the model, we do not keep a balanced
government budget and excess tax revenues are assumed to finance bureaucracy.
The Effect of Marriage and Divorce Probabilities on Labor Supply
In this subsection, we use our model that we described in Section 3.5, and calibrated
to match the US economy in Section 3.6, to study the impact of marriage and divorce
probabilities on labor supply. We do this by imposing the marriage and divorce
probabilities that we computed for each of the European countries in our sample on
the model. Figure 3.8 shows how it affects hours worked17. We obtain a positive
correlation between the model’s predictions and the data (equal to 0.467). As we
17Since we do not have the intensive margin in our model, we compute the predicted annual hours
worked for all European countries in our sample as a product of employment rates predicted by our
model and hours worked by employment persons in the data in the US.
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expect, higher marriage stability reduces labor supply both in the model and in the
data.
Ideally, if the model matched the data perfectly, all observations would be lo-
cated somewhere on the diagonal line. The distance from the diagonal shows the
discrepancy between the data and the model prediction.
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Figure 3.8: The Impact of Marriage and Divorce Probabilities on Hours Worked,
Both Genders
Table 3.10 and figures 3.9 and 3.10 illustrate the impact on the employment rates
for men and women. Unfortunately, we cannot perform the comparison by gender in
terms of the hours worked because of the lack of the data. However, as we show in
Section 3.3, marriage stability appears to affect mostly the extensive margin.
Figure 3.9 shows a rather high correlation (equal to 0.825) between our model’s
predictions and data for the individuals of both genders – higher marriage stability
appears to reduce labor supply both in the model and in the data. Figure 3.10 shows
that the correlation between the model predictions and the data is even higher for
women (equal to 0.889). Figure 3.19 in appendix shows that the correlation between
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Table 3.10: The Impact of Marriage and Divorce Probabilities on Employment Rates
Country
Aggregate Employment Rates Female Employment Rates Male Employment Rates
Actual Model Actual Model Actual Model
US 0.770 0.770 0.699 0.699 0.841 0.841
Greece 0.610 0.704 0.450 0.608 0.781 0.800
Italy 0.574 0.706 0.421 0.616 0.728 0.795
Spain 0.610 0.727 0.445 0.646 0.774 0.809
Belgium 0.662 0.733 0.564 0.649 0.759 0.817
Switzerland 0.809 0.745 0.715 0.669 0.903 0.821
Germany 0.687 0.739 0.610 0.659 0.762 0.819
Netherlands 0.737 0.749 0.637 0.668 0.835 0.829
UK 0.737 0.755 0.665 0.685 0.810 0.825
Norway 0.805 0.771 0.763 0.702 0.847 0.840
Denmark 0.779 0.774 0.733 0.703 0.823 0.844
Finland 0.718 0.781 0.684 0.720 0.751 0.841
the model’s predictions and the data is substantially worse for men (equal to 0.474).
This is not surprising, as we expect the marriage stability mechanism to be able to
better account for the behavior of women.
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Figure 3.9: The Impact of Marriage and Divorce Probabilities on Employment Rates,
Both Genders
We conclude that the marriage stability mechanism works in the right direction in
our model by reducing the labor supply in the countries with more stable marriages.
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As one would expect, this mechanism appears to be able to account better for the
labor supply of women.
The Impact of Differences in Taxation on Labor Supply
Figure 3.20 compares the predictions of our model to the data when we assume that
the divorce and marriage probabilities in all countries are the same as in the US,
but replace the tax system in the model by the one computed for each country using
the OECD data (as described in section 3.6), and furthermore assume that all the
difference in tax revenues that result from the change of the tax system go to waistful
government spending. The figure shows that there is little impact on hours worked in
our model in this case. We in fact obtain a negative correlation between our model’s
predictions and the data. Table 3.22 shows that one feature of the tax system that
appears to be particularly important in our model is whether the married couples are
taxed jointly or separately. In table 3.24, we see that our model predicts that labor
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supply is noticeably higher in the countries that practice separate taxation. Table
3.23 shows that this is primarily driven in the model by higher employment ratios of
women.
Figure 3.21 shows that the predictions of our model improve when we assume that
the additional tax revenues are redistributed to all the agents in the economy as a
lump sum. This illustrates that the use of the tax revenues is crucial in our model
for taxes to have a negative effect on labor supply.
The Combined Impact of Divorces and Taxation on Labor Supply
Figure 3.11 shows the impact of both the divorce and tax mechanisms combined in
our model. When we include both mechanisms in the model, the correlation between
the model’s predictions and the data increase to 0.637, and we are able to explain
41% of the variation in hours worked in the data (as shown by the R2).
On average, the experiment with changing only the divorce rates can account for
22% of the difference between the US and European countries in our sample, the
experiment with changing only the tax system (and assuming redistribution of the
additional tax revenues) can account for 19% of the difference, and in the experiment
with both mechanisms included we account for 28% of the difference.
As can be seen from table 3.11, for Italy, Spain and Greece marriage stability
appears to be a more important mechanism, while taxes is a relatively good predictor
of labor supply in Germany, Belgium and Scandinavia. One interesting observation
is that by a more careful modeling of the tax systems and introduction of the di-
vorce mechanism we are able to resolve what Rogerson (2007) calls a puzzle, the
fact that Scandinavian countries have among the highest taxes but still greater labor
supply than a country like Germany. An important feature of the tax system in all
Scandinavian countries (except Norway) is separate taxation of married couples. As
was pointed out by Guner et al. (2008), this can help explain higher labor supply in
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these countries. For Denmark and Finland, the average tax level mechanism cannot
account for the higher labor supply in these countries compared with Germany, as
average tax level is higher in Denmark and about the same in Finland. However,
both of these countries have separate taxation of married couples.
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Figure 3.11: The Impact of Taxes and Marriage and Divorce Probabilities on Hours
Worked, Both Genders
We conclude that our counterfactual experiments suggest that both the divorce
and the tax mechanisms are important for accounting for the differences in labor
supply between the US and Europe. The significance of these two mechanisms appear
to vary for different European countries. When combined, they on average allow us
to account for 28% of the difference.
3.8 Conclusion
In this paper we show that prime aged women is the largest contributor to differences
in aggregate labor supply between the US and Europe. We document a negative cross-
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Table 3.11: Labor Supply, Taxation and Marriage and Divorce Rates
The table shows the hours worked (predicted from the model and taken from the data)
as a percent of hours worked in the US
Country Divorces Taxation Divorces and Taxation Data
US 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000
Greece 91.536 104.381 95.566 87.056
Italy 91.718 99.362 91.978 73.701
Spain 94.539 100.871 93.954 73.007
Belgium 95.319 91.562 88.234 69.167
Switzerland 96.840 99.869 93.655 97.234
Germany 96.060 88.782 86.648 70.987
Netherlands 97.334 97.685 95.696 72.762
UK 98.088 99.765 98.634 90.783
Norway 100.208 92.056 92.069 83.313
Denmark 100.585 89.287 90.821 88.802
Finland 101.482 97.282 98.647 86.886
country correlation between tax levels and labor supply and a positive correlation
between divorce rates and labor supply across time and place. The latter correlation
is, however, driven by a strong correlation between female labor supply and divorce
rates.
To quantify the impact of differences in tax schemes and divorce / marriage rates
on labor supply, we develop a life-cycle, overlapping-generations model with hetero-
geneous agents, marriage, and divorce. We calibrate our model to US data and study
how labor supply in the US change as we introduce European tax systems, and as we
replace the US divorce and marriage rates with their European equivalents. Chang-
ing the US probabilities of marriage and divorce to their European counterparts on
average accounts for 22% of the difference in hours worked between the US and the
11 European countries. When we also introduce European taxes and redistribute the
increase in taxes evenly to all households, we can account for 28% of the difference
in hours worked between the US and Europe.
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Figure 3.12: Share of persons with children younger than 3 years old, by age group
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Figure 3.13: Relationship between tax measures and employment ratios for women
Figure 3.14: Relationship between tax measures and employment ratios for men
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Figure 3.15: Relationship between divorce rates and employment ratios for both
genders
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Figure 3.16: Trends in the number of divorces over time
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3.9.1 Fitting Tax Functions Based on Data from the OECD
For every country in Figure 3, we fit the below polynomial where an individuals
average tax rate is a function of his earnings relative to the average earnings in the
economy:
τ(y) = τ0 + τ1
( y
AE
)0.2
+ τ2
( y
AE
)0.4
+ τ3
( y
AE
)0.6
+ τ4
( y
AE
)0.8
(3.12)
We use this functional form because it generally gives us a very good fit, R2,
and because we get functions that are strictly increasing and well behaved on a
relatively wide range of labor income. We use labor income tax data from the OECD
Tax-Benefit Calculator18 and the OECD Tax Database19. This data is constructed
by the OECD based on tax laws from different countries. The OECD Tax-Benefit
Calculator gives the gross- and net-, after taxes and benefits, labor income, by family
type in 2001. For single individuals we can get tese data for every percentile of
average labor income for a range between 50% and 200% of average labor income.
For married couples, one spouse’s earnings have to be fixed at either 0%, 67%, 100%
or 167% of average labor income, while the other spouse’s earnings can take any whole
percent value between 50% and 200% of average labor income. For countries that
practice joint taxation of married couples, we fit different polynomials for married
and single. We use the data for single and married individuals without children. For
married individuals, we let the couples be as symmetric as possible. In the US this is
inconsequential, since the tax system is completely symmetric, i.e. it does not matter
who makes the income. The OECD Tax Database provides the top marginal tax rate
in each country and the starting point for this tax rate for single individuals. To get
18Available at: www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_34637_39717906_1_1_1_1,00.html.
19Available at: www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34533_1942460_1_1_1_1,00&&en-USS_01DBC.html.
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the tax at earnings above 200% of average labor income, we use this information.
For many countries the top marginal tax rate kicks in before 200% of average labor
income but in the US, for instance, the top marginal tax rate starts at about 9
times average earnings. We then assume that the marginal tax rate increases linearly
between 2 times average earnings and the point where the top marginal tax rate
becomes effective. For countries that practice joint taxation of married couples, we
assume that the top marginal tax rate for married starts at twice the level for singles.
Country τ0 τ1 τ2 τ3 τ4 R
2
France -0.4677592 2.062677 -2.743411 1.820481 -0.4305004 0.9989
Germany -0.5409343 -0.9886915 4.474231 -3.421762 0.7909097 0.9962
Ireland 1.612143 -6.871639 9.391285 -4.898055 0.8901651 0.9940
Norway -5.335858 14.96881 -15.43612 7.362051 -1.335945 0.9981
Portugal 3.907341 -12.23614 13.88106 -6.514196 1.101643 0.9995
Spain -2.811092 8.034616 -8.401096 4.023208 -0.7058137 0.9959
Switzerland -16.09581 48.2164 -53.35435 26.20165 -4.78368 0.9950
USA 2.16239 -7.301506 9.221961 -4.736035 0.8718943 0.9949
Table 3.12: Country Tax Functions for Married Couples
Table 3.13: Country Tax Functions for Singles
Country τ0 τ1 τ2 τ3 τ4 R
2
Austria -5.626168 16.19854 -16.39948 7.397988 -1.250442 0.9937
Belgium -4.587984 13.62661 -14.19084 6.823648 -1.24974 0.9959
Denmark 0.1422833 -2.357568 5.737164 -3.968169 0.8855884 0.9940
Finland -1.387284 2.706099 -0.9767094 -0.0860593 0.0717587 0.9987
France 0.7157418 -2.514716 3.64648 -1.88936 0.3320441 0.9980
Germany -6.582745 19.08046 -19.22463 8.580912 -1.430125 0.9964
Greece -5.55185 14.76655 -14.7313 6.887032 -1.237959 0.9909
Ireland -1.75284 2.625375 0.1463597 -1.13193 0.3456357 0.9983
Italy -1.555522 2.965259 -0.9916236 -0.3076185 0.1599916 0.9992
Netherlands 1.126893 -4.322011 6.331867 -3.487033 0 .6651015 0.9899
Norway 2.335783 -8.6315 11.83152 -6.471281 1.25354 0.9988
Portugal 2.604929 -9.655736 12.78917 -6.821912 1.293703 0.9994
Spain -2.640157 7.853874 -8.641411 4.527437 -0.9025463 0.9979
Sweden 5.645098 -18.75109 23.36599 -12.24517 2.322895 0.9968
Switzerland -1.4185 5.181097 -6.488006 3.771889 -0.8035895 0.9985
UK -0.3775787 0.2900424 1.07663 -0.9579886 0.2236049 0.9953
USA 1.727408 -6.44973 8.994808 -4.999817 0.9875019 0.9969
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Figure 3.17: Country Tax Functions (Married)
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3.9.2 Computational Details
Computation of Optimal Policies
We put boundaries on the capital space and pick a 16 point grid in K = [kmin, kmax].
Capital is the only continuous state variable. Let J = {hs, c} be the state space for
whether an individual is high school or college educated, X = {0, , 44} be the state
space for the number of years of labor market experience, and T = {20, , 95} be the
state space for age. The state space for working age married individuals is then:
T × J × J × X × X ×K, for working age single individuals it is: T × J × X ×K,
and for retired individuals, both married and single it is: T × K. We compute the
household’s optimal policies for each state by iterating backwards. We start from age
95, the last period of life. In that period, the next period’s value function is 0, and
the optimal policy is to consume as much as possible. Knowing the value function at
age 95, we can compute optimal policies and value functions for age 94, and so on.
The labor supply decisions are discrete, and so we compare the different options. For
each choice of labor, we must solve for the optimal level of next period’s capital. We
find the optimal choice of capital by “golden search”. To interpolate next period’s
value function outside of the grid, we use cubic splines.
Simulation
We simulate an over lapping generations economy with 100 000 men and 100 000
women in each identical generation. Knowing today’s state, the policy functions,
and next period’s marital status, we can find the next period’s state. To determine
next period’s marital status, we draw a random number, ν ∈ (0, 1), for every single
individual and every married couple in each time period. We use the age dependent
probabilities for divorce and marriage to determine whether a single individual is
going to marry or a couple is going to split. We only let the random number drawn
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by the single men determine if they are going to get married. Then to find them a
partner, we sort single men- and women by their random number and find a partner
for each man that is going to change status. We also make sure that the right number
of men marries someone with the same level of education.
Partial Equilibrium
When we calibrate the model we must have equilibrium in the marriage market, in
the sense that single individuals must have rational expectations about their potential
partners in the next period. This expectation must be taken with respect to education,
experience, and asset holdings, Qjgt(jp, x
′
p, k
′
p). Given his own education, an individual
knows the likelihood of marrying someone whit high school and college education in
the next period. We keep track of the distribution of single individuals in each
education group with respect to capital and experience at every age. We start out
with an educated guess and then solve the model iteratively until we reach a fixed
point.
When we perform the policy experiments we must also solve for a fixed point in
terms of the average earnings in the economy because the tax functions, the social
security payments, and the value of not working are kept as functions of average
earnings. Finally when redistributing the increase in tax revenues, we must solve for
a fixed point in terms of the lump sum redistribution.
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Table 3.14: Annual Hours Worked, by Age Group, LIS 2000
Country 15-20 yr % of US 21-55 yr % of US 56-64 yr % of US
US 363.70 100.0 1600.89 100.0 1077.54 100.0
Germany 310.46 85.4 1154.65 72.1 582.38 54.0
Italy 102.50 28.2 1232.94 77.0 505.38 46.9
Spain 167.36 46.0 1177.30 73.5 644.34 59.8
Ireland 336.59 92.5 1309.16 81.8 782.43 72.6
Austria 571.16 157.0 1325.48 82.8 507.15 47.1
Belgium 90.54 24.9 1132.67 70.8 320.16 29.7
Netherlands 352.51 96.9 1152.01 72.0 446.21 41.4
Greece 173.91 47.8 1422.52 88.9 698.62 64.8
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Figure 3.18: Share of Married and Divorced Women at Different Ages
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Table 3.15: Annual hours worked, by age group and sex, LIS 2000
Country
Men Women
15-20 yr % of US 21-55 yr % of US 56-64 yr % of US 15-20 yr % of US 21-55 yr % of US 56-64 yr % of US
US 380.80 100.0 1865.56 100.0 1309.24 100.0 345.88 100.0 1349.64 100.0 874.74 100.0
Germany 333.71 87.6 1464.09 78.5 779.80 59.6 287.22 83.0 857.98 63.6 395.93 45.3
Italy 130.80 34.3 1645.44 88.2 782.11 59.7 72.63 21.0 827.07 61.3 239.35 27.4
Spain 243.36 63.9 1587.55 85.1 992.96 75.8 85.96 24.9 768.40 56.9 321.42 36.7
Ireland 432.49 113.6 1761.80 94.4 1274.16 97.3 230.79 66.7 865.56 64.1 283.31 32.4
Austria 696.83 183.0 1649.07 88.4 725.37 55.4 452.59 130.9 1004.45 74.4 296.82 33.9
Belgium 155.56 40.9 1426.76 76.5 498.50 38.1 19.62 5.7 868.73 64.4 156.29 17.9
Netherlands 337.53 88.6 1530.10 82.0 679.06 51.9 366.06 105.8 788.86 58.4 225.45 25.8
Greece 261.82 68.8 1948.03 104.4 1169.27 89.3 101.26 29.3 931.88 69.0 277.77 31.8
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Table 3.16: Annual hours worked, with and without children, LIS 2000
Country
Men Women
child 3 % of US child 6 % of US no children % of US child 3 % of US child 6 % of US no children % of US
US 2096.01 100.0 2093.84 100.0 1502.11 100.0 946.43 100.0 1021.13 100.0 1197.06 100.0
Germany 1604.33 76.5 1585.37 75.7 1170.99 78.0 196.58 20.8 304.35 29.8 786.22 65.7
Italy 2027.87 96.7 1976.34 94.4 1257.59 83.7 757.66 80.1 744.57 72.9 645.82 54.0
Spain 1883.10 89.8 1871.86 89.4 1273.15 84.8 676.93 71.5 642.64 62.9 631.69 52.8
Ireland 2045.85 97.6 2063.94 98.6 1390.88 92.6 680.39 71.9 639.05 62.6 740.95 61.9
Austria 1725.81 82.3 1751.53 83.7 1370.35 91.2 434.21 45.9 543.47 53.2 895.71 74.8
Belgium 1525.43 72.8 1540.27 73.6 1118.88 74.5 852.11 90.0 856.72 83.9 678.38 56.7
Netherlands 1668.32 79.6 1681.76 80.3 1232.26 82.0 583.29 61.6 568.38 55.7 702.31 58.7
Greece 2195.55 104.7 2218.34 105.9 1582.30 105.3 899.60 95.1 883.38 86.5 716.79 59.9
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Table 3.17: Contribution of different demographic groups to the difference in average
hours worked between the US and Europe
Germany
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.391 0.507 0.171 0.743
21-55: 25.379 10.538 33.299 14.594
56-64: 6.053 1.074 4.465 2.787
Total: 43.941 56.058
Austria
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.422 -9.176 -0.720 -2.356
21-55: 27.700 3.199 34.182 20.023
56-64: 12.037 0.308 8.663 5.719
Total: 34.488 65.511
Belgium
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: -0.103 3.025 0.362 4.172
21-55: 26.239 8.854 22.143 16.891
56-64: 7.473 1.789 5.763 3.393
Total: 47.276 52.723
Netherlands
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.380 0.434 0.030 -0.379
21-55: 23.357 6.533 36.989 14.941
56-64: 6.649 1.690 6.215 3.160
Total: 39.043 60.956
107
Table 3.18: Contribution of different demographic groups to the difference in average
hours worked between the US and Europe, continued
Greece
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.760 3.320 0.698 7.129
21-55: -6.865 -3.162 45.841 29.511
56-64: 4.366 0.271 10.115 8.016
Total: -1.309 101.309
Ireland
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.590 -1.744 0.648 2.452
21-55: 4.882 7.890 44.842 26.557
56-64: -0.173 0.511 8.148 5.397
Total: 11.956 88.043
Spain
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: -0.036 2.149 0.346 3.894
21-55: 12.859 12.912 33.838 21.756
56-64: 3.853 0.699 5.518 2.211
Total: 32.436 67.563
Italy
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.407 4.092 0.395 4.285
21-55: 11.360 10.105 32.058 19.440
56-64: 6.371 1.376 5.980 4.132
Total: 33.710 66.289
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Table 3.19: Tax-Related Measures by Country (2001)
Country Max
marginal
rate
Earnings level where the max
marginal rate becomes effec-
tive
Consumption
tax
Average labor income tax
rate paid by the average
worker
Austria 42.7% 2.2*AE 20.0 32.0%
Belgium 67.5% 1.2*AE 21.0 42.2%
Denmark 62.9% 1.0*AE 25.0 43.9%
Finland 59.1% 2.1*AE 22.0 32.8%
France 49.5% 1.8*AE 19.6 29.0%
Germany 51.2% 1.5*AE 16.0 42.4%
Greece 51.6% 3.8*AE 18.0 16.5%
Ireland 48.0% 1.1*AE 21.0 23.3%
Italy 45.9% 3.7*AE 20.0 27.0%
Netherlands 52.0% 1.4*AE 19.0 31.5%
Norway 55.3% 2.4*AE 24.0 31.8%
Portugal 46.6% 4.9*AE 17.0 21.3%
Spain 48.0% 4.2*AE 16.0 19.7%
Sweden 55.5% 1.5*AE 25.0 33.8%
Switzerland 49.5% 3.9*AE 7.6 23.8%
UK 40.0% 1.3*AE 17.5 25.5%
USA 47.4% 9.0*AE 8.4 26.0%
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Figure 3.19: The Impact of Marriage and Divorce Probabilities on Employment Rates,
Men
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Table 3.20: Sample compositions
United States
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.001 0.067 0.003 0.063
21-55: 0.215 0.151 0.234 0.151
56-64: 0.041 0.012 0.039 0.022
Germany
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.049
21-55: 0.195 0.156 0.219 0.146
56-64: 0.070 0.020 0.067 0.029
Total contribution of compositional effects = 2.798%
Spain
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.000 0.057 0.001 0.053
21-55: 0.224 0.153 0.239 0.139
56-64: 0.056 0.008 0.055 0.015
Total contribution of compositional effects = -4.692%
Italy
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.000 0.052 0.001 0.049
21-55: 0.219 0.149 0.248 0.125
56-64: 0.068 0.009 0.061 0.019
Total contribution of compositional effects = -2.597%
Austria
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.001 0.043 0.001 0.045
21-55: 0.208 0.169 0.231 0.149
56-64: 0.063 0.012 0.050 0.028
Total contribution of compositional effects = -1.030%
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Table 3.21: Sample compositions, continued
Belgium
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.036
21-55: 0.242 0.129 0.264 0.150
56-64: 0.054 0.014 0.053 0.020
Total contribution of compositional effects = -8.717%
Greece
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.000 0.040 0.001 0.048
21-55: 0.227 0.129 0.269 0.112
56-64: 0.078 0.005 0.075 0.017
Total contribution of compositional effects = -7.176%
Ireland
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.000 0.071 0.000 0.064
21-55: 0.211 0.160 0.223 0.156
56-64: 0.042 0.015 0.043 0.014
Total contribution of compositional effects = -2.310%
Netherlands
Men Women
Age: Married Single Married Single
15-20: 0.000 0.038 0.001 0.041
21-55: 0.223 0.160 0.251 0.147
56-64: 0.053 0.014 0.052 0.019
Total contribution of compositional effects = -6.174%
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Table 3.22: The Impact of Taxation (without Redistributiion) on Hours Worked
The table shows the hours worked (predicted from the model and taken from the data)
as percent of the hours worked in the US
Country
Aggregate Employment Rates
Actual Model
Countries with joint taxation of married couples:
US 100.000 100.000
Germany 70.987 98.400
Norway 83.313 101.351
Spain 73.007 101.625
Switzerland 97.234 100.012
Countries with separate taxation of married
couples:
Greece 87.056 107.839
Italy 73.701 109.412
Belgium 69.167 110.231
Netherlands 72.762 109.555
UK 90.783 108.411
Denmark 88.802 111.193
Finland 86.886 110.959
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Table 3.23: The Impact of Taxation (without Redistribution) on Employment Rates
Country
Aggregate Employment Female Employment Male Employment
Rates Rates Rates
Actual Model Actual Model Actual Model
Countries with joint taxation of married couples:
US 0.771 0.771 0.699 0.700 0.841 0.841
Germany 0.687 0.757 0.610 0.693 0.762 0.821
Norway 0.805 0.780 0.763 0.710 0.847 0.850
Spain 0.610 0.782 0.445 0.716 0.774 0.857
Switzerland 0.809 0.769 0.715 0.699 0.903 0.840
Countries with separate taxation of married couples:
Greece 0.610 0.830 0.450 0.779 0.781 0.880
Italy 0.574 0.842 0.421 0.800 0.728 0.883
Belgium 0.662 0.848 0.564 0.809 0.759 0.887
Netherlands 0.737 0.843 0.637 0.800 0.835 0.885
UK 0.737 0.834 0.665 0.783 0.810 0.885
Denmark 0.779 0.855 0.733 0.823 0.823 0.888
Finland 0.718 0.854 0.684 0.816 0.751 0.891
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Figure 3.20: The Impact of Taxation without Redistribution on Employment Rates,
Both Genders
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Table 3.24: The Impact of Taxation (with Redistribution) on Hours Worked
The table shows the hours worked (predicted from the model and taken from the data)
as percent of the hours worked in the US
Country
Aggregate Employment Rates
Actual Model
Countries with joint taxation of married couples:
US 100.00 100.00
Germany 88.782 70.987
Norway 92.056 83.313
Spain 100.871 73.007
Switzerland 99.869 97.234
Countries with separate taxation of married
couples:
Greece 104.381 87.056
Italy 99.362 73.701
Belgium 91.562 69.167
Netherlands 97.685 72.762
UK 99.765 90.783
Denmark 89.287 88.802
Finland 97.282 86.886
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Figure 3.21: The Impact of Taxation with Redistribution on Hours Worked, Both
Genders
Table 3.25: Regressing Average Hours Worked on Divorce rate and Tax Measures
(including joint versus separate taxation of married couples)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Const 1321.374∗∗∗ 1166.408∗∗∗ 1258.269∗∗∗ 1395.375∗∗∗
(217.377) (142.989) (86.756) (115.362)
Divorce rate 27.097∗ 19.428 41.959∗∗∗ 36.638∗∗∗
(14.248) (14.142) (12.010) (11.163)
Top marginal tax rate −6.413 – – –
( 4.497)
Progressivity wedge – −629.507 – –
(557.163)
Average labor income tax – – −1183.122∗∗∗ –
(334.931)
Average effective tax rate – – – −1160.108∗∗∗
(318.644)
Separate Taxation 0.197 -0.002 16.046 32.918
(59.042) (61.365) (45.244) (45.770)
adjusted R2 0.085 0.037 0.460 0.476
Standard errors are in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Proof of Proposition 3.4.1
Given the choice of the utility function, one can solve for h2,f and h
s
2,f in terms
of h1,f from equations 3.1 and 3.2, and after plugging these solutions into 3.3, obtain
that the dependence of h1,f on πd is implicitly defined by:
G(h1,f , pid) =
αw1,f
w1,m + w1,fh1,f
+ (1− pid)
(
kf
w1,f + kfh1,f + w1,m + km
(
α+ (α− 1)
(
w1,m + km
w1,f + kfh1,f
)))
+ pid
(
αkf
w1,f + kfh1,f
)
−
1− α
1− h1,f
= 0
Using the implicit function theorem, one can show that:
sign
(
∂h1,f
∂pid
)
= sign
(
∂G
∂pid
)
= sign
(
α
w1,f + kfh1,f
−
1
w1,f + kfh1,f + w1,m + km
(
α+ (α− 1)
(
w1,m + km
w1,f + kfh1,f
)))
Since
w1,f+kfh1,f+w1,m+km
w1,f+kfh1,f
> 1 > 1 + α−1
α
(
w1,m+km
w1,f+kfh1,f
)
, we get
∂h1,f
∂pid
> 0.
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